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11 Oct 67

[] Memo for Record re MACV Press Briefing

Attachments: Briefing on "Crossover"

State Telegram (Saigon 7867), 7 Oct 67,
re Measurements in Progress

Tables: Forces in South Viet-Nam, End of
Month, for 1965-67

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11 Oct 67

[] to Carver memo re MACV Press Briefing on Enemy
Order of Battle (contains comments on draft MACV press
briefing)

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23 Oct 67

[] to Carver memo re Revised DOD Briefing on VC/NVA
Order of Battle

No Date

Handwritten table on Recruiting, Infiltration, Losses,
and Net (for MACV press briefing)

Package 1

21 Aug 67

George Allen memo to the Director re Bunker's 16th
Weekly (Saigon 3243, 16 August 1967)

29 Aug 67

Carver to Brig. Gen. Godding memo re Transmittal of
Draft Estimate (no attachment)

31 Aug 67

Carver to the Director memo re Bunker's 18th Weekly
(Saigon 4452, 30 August 1967)

1 Sep 67

Carver Cable re Carver trip to Saigon to discuss Communist
strength estimate with General Westmoreland and
Ambassador Bunker

1 Sep 67

Carver Cable re handling of draft NIE 14.3-67

21 Sep 67

Carver Cable requesting copy of MACV J-2 estimates staff
briefing on Communist military losses ("Crossover")
and reason for request

18 Sep 67

Carver to DCI short note re Carver to Ambassador Bunker
memo (attached), 15 Sep 67, Agreement on Viet Cong
Strength Figures

10 Oct 67

Carver to DDI short note re Asst. Sec. Goulding's
transmittal of draft briefing on enemy OB to be given
by MACV PIO (no attachment)

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Package 1
(Continued)

13 Oct 67 Carver to Goulding memo re Transmittal of Requested
Comments on Proposed MACV Press Briefing on
Enemy OB (attached)

25X1 13 Oct 67 Carver to [] and [] short note re [] 25X1
first cut at a reply to Saigon 7867 (no attachment) 25X1

24 Oct 67 Page 1 of memo to the DCI re 24 October McNamara Meeting

Package 2

7 Mar 68 Fulbright to Helms memo forwarding the following:

Attachments: Dep. Sec. of Defense to Fulbright letter
re information requested on Vietnam,
1 Mar 68

Fulbright to McNamara letter, 9 Feb 68,
difficulties in measuring military and
political progress in Vietnam and
requesting comments on enemy strength
(response attached)

Package 3

25X1 11 Sep 67 Carver Cable [] re problems in dealing with MACV
on strength figures [] handwritten statistics 25X1
attached)

25X1 13 Sep 67 Carver Cable [] re agreed set of figures endorsed
by Westmoreland

25X1 12 Sep 67 Carver Cable [] re Joint CIA-DIA-INR Representatives'
Position on Viet Cong Strength Estimates

Package 4

19 Apr 68 Blind Memo re Attrition of VC/NVA Forces in South Vietnam
First Quarter 1968

Attachment: Table, 17 Apr 68, Estimates of Organized
Enemy Strengths in South Vietnam
(31 March 1968)

1 Apr 68 Table: Communist Force Structure in South Vietnam
(29 February 1968)

Package 4
(Continued)

27 Mar 68 Blind Memo re Order of Battle vs. Estimate of Strength

19 Mar 68 Blind Memo re The Communists' Ability to Recoup Their
Tet Military Losses

25X1 No Date [] handwritten statistics on estimates

22 May 73 Blind Memo re CIA and MACV Estimates of Communist Forces
in South Vietnam as of 1 January 1968

25X1 No Date [] handwritten statistics on strength estimates

23 May 73 Blind Memo re Estimates of Khmer Communist Military
Forces (KC) in Cambodia, [] Copy 1 25X1

24 May 73 Blind Memo re Comparative CIA and MACV Estimates of
VC/NVA Military Forces in South Vietnam, 1 January 1968,
[] Copy 1 25X1

24 May 73 Ch/D/S to Chief, DDO/EA memo re Khmer Communist Order of
Battle

Attachments: Blind Memo, 24 May 73, re Khmer Communist
Order of Battle, [] Copy 1 25X1

Machine Listing, 22 May 73, re Order of
Battle of Khmer Communist Military Forces,
Cambodia

Package 5

10 Oct 67 Carver to DDI short note re draft briefing on enemy OB
to be given by MACV PIO (attached)

25X1 12 Oct 67 Carver to [] short note re draft reply to 10 Oct 67
memo on proposed MACV briefing

Attachment: Memo to Philip Goulding re proposed MACV
Briefing on Enemy Order of Battle

20 Oct 67 Carver to Acting Director memo re Revised DOD Order of
Battle Briefing (attached)

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MACV Press Briefing & OB Problems

Package 1

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Reply to Saigon

~~George A. Carver, Jr.~~

1. Attached is [redacted] first cut at a reply to [redacted] dealing with the statistics that Saigon proposes to use. As I think I have told you, Bundy has already sent a cable commending the Mission for its energies but telling them to hold off on releasing any statistics until they receive a separate telegram. This, when it goes, will be the separate telegram.

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2. This is [redacted] own private copy which no one has seen. I would like informal comments as soon as possible. We will get a second and more official crack before it goes out. Would you please let me have your immediate thoughts right away.

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George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

AS

GAC:taw:13Oct67

Orig - hand carried to [redacted]
w/2 atts -

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1 - GAC Chrono w/o atts ✓

1 - VAS Chrono w/o atts

Orig - MAC ✓ Chase Puffering

13 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Philip Goulding
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Requested Comments

1. For Mr. Henkin's 10 October request, I am forwarding the attached comments on the version of the proposed MACV briefing submitted with Mr. Henkin's memorandum.

2. The question of whether or not any public briefing on order of battle figures is given is a matter outside our purview and hence a matter on which this Agency can neither concur nor dissent.

3. It is our understanding that explicit instructions are in force that no such briefing is to be authorized without specific White House approval.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

Distribution:

Original-- Addressee, w/att.

- 1 - [] DCI, w/att.
- 1 - [] /DDCI/ER, w/att.
- 1 - D/OCI, w/att.
- 1 - D/ONE, w/att.
- 1 - DDI, w/att.
- ✓ 1 - GAC Chrono, w/att.
- 1 - VAS Chrono, w/att.
- 1 - ~~SVN OB File (?)~~ *MACV Press Briefing*

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13 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Philip Goulding
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

SUBJECT : Proposed MACV Press Briefing on Enemy Order
of Battle

1. We have carefully reviewed the proposed MACV press briefing on enemy order of battle attached to Mr. Henkin's memo of 10 October 1967. We have serious substantive and procedural problems with the 10 October version of this proposed briefing and hence cannot support it or concur in its use.

2. With regard to the substantive issues, we offer the following comments:

a. We have no problems with the 119,000 figure used for the regular forces though we have not seen the evidence or methodology supporting the statement that "regular strength peaked at 127,500 in September 1966."

b. On administrative services, we believe the operative sentence should indicate that the US Government now estimates that there are at least 35,000 to 40,000 full-time personnel in this category. The draft briefing portrays the 35,000-40,000 figure as a minimum-maximum range. We regard it as a minimum threshold, believe the number of full-time personnel may well be higher, and are certain that additional large numbers of individuals perform administrative support tasks on a part-time but more than casual basis.

c. On the guerrillas, we cannot accept the statement that current guerrilla strength "is clearly down to between 70,000 and 90,000 with strong indications that the actual figure is

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closer to be lower than the higher limits of the estimate." The last clause of that sentence is particularly unacceptable. The understanding reached in Saigon during the recent CIA-DIA-INR-MACV order of battle discussions was that the guerrilla strength is now probably (not clearly) between 70,000 and 90,000.

d. We also cannot accept the way in which the rest of what used to be called "irregular" forces -- i.e., the self-defense, secret self-defense, assault youth and other casual elements -- are written off as "fifth columnists" and "fellow travellers." This mis-states the facts. Although we agree that the self-defense, secret self-defense and assault youth should not be included in the military order of battle per se, we feel that in the aggregate these elements contribute a great deal to overall VC capabilities. Furthermore, evidence continues to come in showing that the VC make considerable use of these "irregulars" and not infrequently assign them actual combat tasks. We believe that any briefing must be candid about these VC elements and should generally follow the narrative account of their strength and function agreed in Saigon -- the text of which is attached hereto.

e. On the political cadre, the number used (75,000-85,000) is that agreed upon in Saigon but the number was not developed in the manner outlined in your 10 October draft. This draft suggests that the new figure was developed by taking the old figure of 40,000 and adding political elements at hamlet level. This is simply not true. The 40,000 (actually 39,000) figure is an old GVN figure in circulation long before our current definitions of infrastructure were developed. It bears no historical or other relationship to the new figure.

3. Apart from these matters of substance there are elements of tone and procedure in your 10 October draft with which we have considerable difficulty.

a. It is true that our new order of battle figures derive from greatly improved, though still imperfect, intelligence and do not reflect any recent absolute increase in the size of

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Communist forces. This fact and the thought that these figures will be subjected to continuous review and frequent changes should be the basic theme of any press briefing. The 10 October draft, however, overstates our present degree of confidence in the figures for the administrative services, guerrillas and political cadres. We are not this confident; in fact, we believe that new evidence will probably turn up and require us to modify these figures. If this occurs, the confident tone of any such press briefing will be recalled with considerable damage to our credibility.

b. The whole proposed treatment of the old irregular and new guerrilla figure will be torn apart by the Saigon press corps. It suggests that we have previously overestimated this category whereas exactly the reverse is true. As the press well knows, the old "irregular" figure of 100,000-120,000 was allegedly composed of one-third guerrillas and two-thirds self-defense/secret self-defense. Thus the press will believe, with justification, that our old "guerrilla" figure was on the order of 33,000-40,000. If we up the guerrilla estimate, as we should, to 70,000-90,000, this can hardly be called a downward adjustment.

c. Any attempt to ignore the other components that used to be carried in the "irregular" category or write them off as unimportant fifth columnists will be considered by the press (again with justification) as a clumsy piece of dissimulation.

d. On the political cadre, we would be much better advised not to lump our political cadre estimates with our military order of battle data nor to pretend that we now have a very firm handle on this component of the Communist organization. The 75,000-85,000 figure can be used, if necessary, but should be used as the number we get from applying our current definition of "infrastructure," with the added notation that this definition is in serious need of refinement and hence this number is perishable and not particularly meaningful. It should also be pointed out that we are now at work on

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refining our definition of the various components of the Communist political organization and hope to be able to assign meaningful numbers to these components as soon as this exercise is completed. When we do, this 75,000-80,000 figure will disappear.

4. We believe that the net effect of any briefing based on the 10 October draft would be to present a series of alleged intelligence judgments that could not be substantiated at this time and would almost certainly compound our credibility problems if they were presented in this form. Whether or not any briefing is given and the precise language to be used are, of course, matters outside our purview and ones that will require consideration at highest levels. We strongly recommend, however, that the briefing outlined in your 10 October draft not be given.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

O/DCI/SAVA/GAC:lkp/13October1967

Distribution

Original - Addressee

- 1 - [redacted] /DCI
- 1 - [redacted] /DDCI/ER
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- 1 - D/ONE
- ✓ 1 - GAC Chrono
- 1 - VAS Chrono
- 1 - SVN OB File (?)

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10 Oct 67

DDI, D/OCI, D/ONE, D/OER

GACarver, Jr.

MACV's OB Briefing

1. Attached is a memorandum from Assistant Secretary Goulding's office transmitting a draft briefing on enemy order of battle to be given by the MACV PIO. Mr. Goulding, through me, has asked for the Director's comments on this draft.

2. Would you please have your offices look this over carefully. I would appreciate having your comments by 1500, Wednesday, 11 October, so that I may raise this with the Director and give him our coordinated views on Wednesday afternoon.

George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

A/S

Distribution

1@ - Addressees w/att

1 - DOD Special Projects w/att

~~1 - VC Military Capabilities and Intentions w/att~~

1 - GAC Chrono w/o att

1 - VAS Chrono w/o att

1 - VAS/RAC

MACV Press Briefing w/att

18 Sept 67

The Director

GACarver, Jr.

Agreement on Viet Cong Strength
Figures

Attached for your information is a copy of the memorandum I gave Ambassador Bunker on 15 September as a wind-up report on our Saigon discussions. I also used this paper as the basis of my 16 September briefing of the CINCPAC staff.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment
a/s

GAC:mee

Orig - DCI w/att

1 - ~~VC Military Capabilities and Intentions~~ w/att

1 - CAC Chhono w/att

1 - VAS Chrono ~~w/att~~ w/p att

1 - VAS/RAC w/att

1 copy memo to Bunker



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DIA

Saigon, Vietnam

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15 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Ambassador

SUBJECT : Agreement on Viet Cong Strength Figures

As I reported in our 14 September conversation, agreement has been reached between COMUSMACV and the representatives of CIA, DIA and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research on the following estimate of current Viet Cong strength:

MILITARY

Main and Local Forces	119,000 - (119,000)
Administrative Services	35,000 - 40,000
Guerrillas	<u>70,000</u> <u>90,000</u>

Total Military Force	224,000 - 249,000
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<u>POLITICAL CADRE</u>	75,000 - 85,000
------------------------	-----------------

Aggregate Total	299,000 334,000
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The issue of the "irregulars" (self-defense, secret self-defense, assault youth, etc.) derived from COMUSMACV strong feeling that no quantified estimate of current strength should be given (since this would give a number that could be taken and used out of context) and the need felt in Washington for some form of order of magnitude indication. This issue was resolved by treating the subject in narrative form. A copy of the agreed draft text on this topic was given to you on 14 September.

Though the above figures show an aggregate total, we in Washington are of the strong conviction - shared by our colleagues in MACV - that this aggregate total is meaningless and misleading. Washington publications on this topic will not use or refer to any such aggregate total.

Though we have reached agreement on a political cadre total using presently accepted definitions, we also agree that these

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definitions need considerable refinement and, hence, the number they dictate is not particularly meaningful or helpful. Present definitions include much more than the true political "leadership" but exclude many trained and full-time activists. General Davidson, my Saigon colleagues and I are jointly initiating an interagency effort to refine and improve our analysis and conceptual break-out of the enemy's political organization. When this necessary work is completed, the "political" figure in its present form will disappear.

I understand that General Westmoreland has formally endorsed the agreements outlined above and so reported to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As indicated in our conversation, the discussions which led to these agreements were lively but most beneficial to all parties involved. The atmosphere has been cleared, we have much better understanding of each others' views, and I believe Washington and Saigon will now be on the same wave length, something that will greatly benefit all aspects of our common endeavor.

Per your request, I am appending a spread sheet which summarizes the initial Washington and Saigon positions and the process through which final agreement was reached. I would be most grateful if, through General Westmoreland, you would extend to General Davidson and all of his able, most impressive staff, the thanks of the entire Washington delegation for their effective, comprehensive briefings and other invaluable contributions to the success of our joint endeavor.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant to the Director
of Central Intelligence for
Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment
As Stated Above

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S E C R E T

	<u>NIE 14.3 28 August Draft</u>	<u>11 Sept. MACV Briefing</u>	<u>11 Sept. MACV Proposal</u>	<u>Washington Reps. Proposal</u>	<u>Final Figur Agreed</u>
MILITARY					
Main & Local Force	121,000 - (121,000)	119,000	119,000 - (119,000)	119,000 - 119,000	119,000-119,000
Admin Service	40,000 - 60,000	29,000	25,000 - 35,000	35,000 - 45,000	35,000- 40,000
Trillas	60,000 - 100,000	65,000	75,000 - 95,000	75,000 - 95,000	70,000- 90,000
Military Total	221,000 - 281,000	213,000	219,000 - 249,000 (234,000)	229,000 - 259,000	224,000-249,000
POLITICAL	90,000 - (90,000)	85,000	70,000 - 80,000	80,000 90,000	75,000- 85,000
Aggregate Total	311,000 - 371,000	298,000	289,000 - 329,000	309,000 - 349,000	289,000-334,000

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31 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Bunker's 18th Weekly (Saigon 4452, 30 August 1967, [REDACTED])

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1. The bulk of this long and rather disorganized cable (48 out of 53 paragraphs) is devoted to the elections and topics immediately related thereto. The cable is difficult to read, primarily because of its lack of organization, and I do not recommend that you try, although you can flip to any paragraph at random and get the general tone and flavor.

2. Bunker's basic message is that despite all alarums and excursions, the election process is going reasonably well and, indeed, much better than might have been expected. The candidates are more or less behaving, and the nature of the free-swinging criticism that abounds gives the lie to any claims that the government is trying to railroad the show. There are bound to be some irregularities but Bunker believes these will be minor. He sees the elections (politically) as the culmination of a long and, on the whole, encouraging political process stretching back over the past 18 months. Though there are problems now and will be additional problems after the elections are held, no matter who wins, Bunker is very pleased with the process itself. He also feels, again correctly, that the election is a cause of great concern to our Communist adversaries.

3. You might want to take a look at paragraphs 14-18 in which Bunker explains that one effective measure used to counter Viet Cong anti-election efforts has been the incentive awareness system established by our Station to encourage the Vietnamese to report on the VC. As you may recall, this scheme had a number of birth pangs but has paid off. Bunker praises it highly and gives us full credit for it.

4. Despite the remarks made in the alleged Bunker cable, which Komer almost certainly wrote, earlier this week, Bunker's weekly does not raise the question of NIE 14.3 or the current Washington-Saigon debate over Communist strength figures. This is all to the good, since the situation will be easier to solve if it is brought to the President's attention after rather than before a trans-Pacific understanding has been worked out.

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e A. Carver, Jr.

S. [REDACTED] Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

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29 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General George A. Godding
Deputy J-2, MACV

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Draft Estimate

1. Per our telephone conversation, I am herewith sending you one copy of the 28 August 1967 draft of National Intelligence Estimate 14.3-67: CAPABILITIES OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS FOR FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM, together with one copy of the draft Conclusions (29 August 1967). This copy is for your personal use in briefing senior members of the US Mission in Saigon prior to our visit next week. I must request that the attached draft not be reproduced in any way and that it be shown only to General Westmoreland, General Abrams, General Davidson, Ambassador Komer and, if he desires to see it, Ambassador Bunker.
2. In discussing the attached document with the persons mentioned above, will you please take great pains to emphasize that this is a draft and not in any way a final product or, in its present form, a formal USIB document. It is, of course, imperative that the contents of this draft not be divulged in any manner to unauthorized persons, i.e., anyone other than the individuals specifically enumerated above.

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George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

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21 August 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Bunker's 16th Weekly (Saigon 3243, 16 August 1967)

1. The past week was relatively quiet and Ambassador Bunker's report contains nothing basically new or startling. Hence, suggest you pass this one up without reading in detail.

2. Interesting points include a reiteration of his judgment that the Dong Ha campaign flap -- which has had an unfavorable impact on Congressional opinion -- was a simple mixup, compounded by subsequent misunderstandings and childish efforts by all sides to save "face." The Ambassador believes the election campaign is going reasonably well, under the circumstances, and that much of the journalistic and Congressional criticism is really unwarranted.

3. Ambassador Bunker quotes extensively from General Westmoreland's monthly assessment for July (paragraph 31), which paints a reasonably realistic picture. In essence, the enemy is continuing his strategy of attrition, seeking to spread our forces more thinly, to entice our units into battle under conditions favorable to the enemy, and to counter-attack Revolutionary Development operations. Through "economy of force" measures and superior mobility, our military forces have provided acceptable security to critical population centers and thwarted enemy plans for offensive operations. Our constant pressure on the enemy, especially in the coastal lowlands, has weakened his military structure and heightened popular resistance to the enemy's increasing demands for support.

GEORGE W. ALLEN

Acting Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

State Saigon 3243

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MACV Press Briefing & OB Problems

Package 2

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SECRET ATTACHMENTS
United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Executive Registry

68-1147/23

March 7, 1968

Mr. Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Helms:

I enclose a copy of a letter and attachments from the Deputy Secretary of Defense in response to my letter of February 9, a copy of which is also enclosed.

In view of the importance of statistics in attempting to measure developments in the war, the Committee has tried to obtain, on a regular basis, the best information available with which to make such an assessment. I would, therefore, appreciate having the benefit of your Agency's comments on the information supplied by the Department of Defense to the questions posed by the Committee. If the Agency's estimates differ from those of the Department, please provide your estimates to the Committee.

Sincerely yours,


J. W. Fulbright
J. W. Fulbright
Chairman

Enclosures

SECRET ATTACHMENTS

SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



1 JAN 1968

Honorable J. W. Fulbright
Chairman, Committee on
Foreign Relations
United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in reply to your letter of February 9, 1968, in which you requested certain information on Vietnam. This information is provided in an attachment to this letter.

Most of the points you raised deal with the collection, analysis and interpretation of information which form the basis for our intelligence estimates. You will appreciate, I am sure, that many of these data, as well as the data in the monthly reports you received, are estimates, and although they are the best estimates we can obtain, they are subject to the uncertainties inherent in a combat situation. The estimates do change as additional information becomes available, and this is to be expected. Nevertheless, we find them useful as indicators of general trends.

In question 4, you ask whether or not the CIA agrees with the Department of Defense enemy strength estimates and the infrastructure estimates at the beginning and the end of 1967 and, in question 10, you ask whether the CIA agrees with Defense's estimate of the net loss in enemy strength during 1967. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on CIA's position and I suggest, therefore, that these questions be addressed to Mr. Helms.

Sincerely,

DAVID H. ...

Enclosure

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Question #1:

The December 1967 tabulation of information on Vietnam furnished the Committee listed enemy strength at 219,800, including 51,700 men in the North Vietnamese forces, but excluding 84,000 for the enemy political infrastructure. With the infrastructure included, total enemy strength at the end of 1967 is 303,800. The same tabulation lists enemy strength as 276,900 at the beginning of 1967, without a separate figure for the infrastructure. But the Committee was advised by the Department as late as September 1 last year that enemy strength on December 31, 1966 was 291,900 including 39,200 in the "political" category.

You testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee recently that enemy strength, excluding the infrastructure and self-defense forces, was between 215,000-245,000. You said: "... it seems quite certain that total enemy strength did decline in 1967." What was enemy strength, by category, at the beginning of 1967, excluding the infrastructure and self-defense forces? In other words, what was the beginning strength for comparative purposes?

Answer:

In the statistical tables transmitted to you on December 28, 1967 and on January 27, 1968, confirmed enemy military strength, in thousands, were shown as follows:

Confirmed Enemy Military Strength	12/28/67 <u>Transmittal</u> Strength as of 12/66	1/28/68 <u>Transmittal</u> Strength as of 12/67
VC-Main/Local Forces	65.9	58.8
Guerrillas	126.2	71.7
Admin Services	41.3	37.6
TOTAL	233.4	168.1
NVA-Combat	48.1	51.6
Admin Services	.4	.1
TOTAL	48.5	51.7
Total Confirmed Enemy Military Strength	281.9	219.8

As Mr. McNamara noted in his statement, MACV has been restudying the entire problem of estimating the Communist "Order of Battle" in South Vietnam. The major results of this study are set forth in the attached "MACV Briefing on Enemy Order of Battle."

The data shown in the foregoing table, based on the methodology and estimates now used by MACV, are comparable with respect to force composition. They exclude the political infrastructure. Except for the VC-Main/Local Forces and the NVA Forces, they are not comparable to the information sent to you Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000200190001-7

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Question #2:

What is the current enemy strength including all NVA divisions which have moved into South Vietnam recently? Including NVA forces in Laos or the DMZ area which are in a position to be sent in rapidly?

Answer:

On the basis of information reported by MACV through the end of January, there were no substantial changes in either VC or NVA strength during January. It should be noted, however, that new units, probably elements of two NVA divisions, have apparently moved into the DMZ area. Once confirmed, the strength of these units will be added to the enemy order of battle figures.

Question #3:

What was the size of the infrastructure and self-defense forces at the beginning of 1967? At the end of 1967? Current?

Answer:

The strength of the political infrastructure over the past year and through January 1968 is now estimated to have ranged from 75,000 to 85,000. We no longer carry the Self-Defense forces in our enemy strength totals. As Mr. McNamara noted in his statement, they (along with the Secret Self-Defense Forces and the Communist Political Cadres), are very vague categories which do not lend themselves to any kind of reasonably precise measurement and, even more important, they are not fighting forces.

Question #5:

At a recent briefing by MACV intelligence officers in Saigon, a member of this Committee was given information on enemy infiltration and recruiting capabilities, and expected losses for 1968. According to the MACV intelligence calculations, the enemy's net losses this year would average 5,000 men a month. Do you agree with this estimate? If not, what is the Executive Branch's best estimate?

Answer:

As you are undoubtedly aware, no methodology permits a categorical forecast of enemy personnel gains and losses in South Vietnam. A significant deviation in any of the major factors concerned (e.g., infiltration, local recruiting, defections, and battle casualties) could affect the MACV calculation. On the basis of the testimony, which you mention in Question 6, and assuming infiltration and local recruiting at 7,000 and 3,000-5,000 per month, respectively, the enemy lost about 2,000-4,000 monthly in 1967. The enemy's military losses in 1968 may well increase. Unless he is pinched for manpower, however, and this is not yet apparent, he can offset losses in South Vietnam in several ways. In the final analysis, therefore, it would appear that the question of net enemy military losses in South Vietnam in 1968 will largely depend on policy decisions made in Hanoi.

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Question #6:

Would you please explain the discrepancies between the following categories of enemy losses in 1967 as listed in the December tabulation given the Committee and as included in your testimony before the Armed Services Committee:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Tabulation</u>	<u>Testimony</u>
Deaths from hostile action	88,104	88,000
Captured or detained	53,636	6,000 ("prisoners of war")
Defections	17,672	18,000
Dead or disabled from wounds (est.)	--	30,000
Disabled by disease or deserted (est.)	--	25,000
Totals	159,412	167,000

Answer:

On the first and third items shown above, there are no discrepancies. In each instance, the data furnished you on January 27 were rounded to the nearest thousand for purposes of Mr. McNamara's statement.

With respect to the "captured or detained" category, reported to you on January 27, versus the "prisoners of war" category mentioned in the statement, these are not comparable categories. The "captured or detained" figure, as explained in our September 1, 1967 reply, represents the gross total before screening, of individuals detained since the beginning of the year. As a result of the screening operations, an individual will be categorized into one of several categories - innocent civilian, Hoi Chanh (defector), civil defendant or prisoner of war. The 6,000 prisoners of war mentioned in the testimony represents a rounded-off number of the portion of total "captured or detained" during 1967 who were subsequently categorized as prisoners of war.

As set forth in the statement, the number of "dead or disabled from wounds is a computed figure representing 35 percent of the body count." The application of this percentage to the 88,000 deaths from hostile action gives a figure of 30,800 which was rounded down to 30,000. It was stated that "the number disabled by disease, etc., is simply a guess since we have no solid basis for calculating this figure." There cannot be any discrepancy between the testimony and the data sent to you on January 27 because neither of these sets of data is included in our monthly tabulation. The use of such figures in the testimony was an attempt to give a reasonable and rounded picture of estimated enemy strengths, gains and losses. As Mr. McNamara pointed out, "These estimates, however, must be used with a great deal of caution."

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Enclosure

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Question #8:Answer continued:

enemy is a United States unit, the report of the body count is made to MACV by personnel of that unit. Every ARVN unit down to battalion level has a team of American advisors. If the Vietnamese unit makes the contact, and a fire fight results, the enemy body count is reported to MACV by the American unit advisor to Vietnamese unit.

In some cases, the enemy, in order not to reveal the extent of his losses, carries away his dead and wounded. In other cases, it is impossible to make any count because of battlefield conditions or battle intensity. The body count procedure does not permit estimates in cases such as these nor are estimates made of the enemy killed by air, but there can be no doubt that enemy casualties do result from our air operations.

Question #9:

According to the December tabulation, infiltration through October 1967 totaled 32,800 of the "accepted" category. The Committee was advised earlier that infiltration data on the tabulations for the previous six months would be incomplete, because of problems in verification. In your testimony before Armed Services, you said infiltration averaged "about 7,000 men a month during the first half of 1967" and that it probably continued at about the same rate for the second half.

Why do the statistics in the tabulation for the first few months of 1967 not reflect the 7,000 average rate you cited? Does the 7,000 per month figure include movements of major NVA units into South Vietnam? Do the monthly figures on the tabulation? If not, what was the total for major unit movements into South Vietnam in 1967?

Answer:

The infiltration data in the material sent to you on January 27 reflect the "accepted" infiltration (confirmed and probable) as mutually agreed upon by our respective staff members at their December 13 meeting. During the first half of 1967, these two categories are estimated to have totaled about 25,800. In addition, however, MACV reported an estimated 14,100 "possible" infiltrates during the same six months, bringing the estimated total-confirmed, probable and possible - to 39,900 which averages out to 6,650 per month. Since we are reasonably sure that all infiltrates are not detected, this 6,650 was rounded to 7,000 for use in the statement. These estimated infiltration data cover all infiltrates about whom we have knowledge regardless of the size of the unit involved.

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SECRETQuestion #10:

The explanatory information for the tabulation states that Viet Cong recruiting averaged about 3,000 to 5,000 a month in 1967. Your testimony before the Armed Services Committee also reflected an estimate in this area. Assuming total Viet Cong recruitment of 48,000 men (4,000 per month) last year and the infiltration of 84,000 men (7,000 per month), there was an input of 132,000 in enemy strength in 1967. If enemy losses were 167,000, as you estimated, there would be a net loss in strength of 35,000.

At a recent briefing in Saigon a member of this Committee was told by MACV/s chief of intelligence that the enemy suffered a net loss in strength of 60,000 in 1967. What is the Department's best estimate of the net loss in enemy strength in 1967. Does the CIA agree with this estimate? If not, what is the CIA estimate?

Answer:

The framework for the reply to this question is included in the answer to question five above. A comparison of 1967 enemy gains and losses, as we are now able to define them, would indicate a net loss of 23,000 to 47,000 within South Vietnam, with the mean being 35,000. The figure of 60,000 was apparently based on an assumption by the MACV briefer that the detected infiltration would, during 1967, be lower than the estimates and that recruiting rates would fall at the low end of the estimated range. Any sizeable fluctuation in either the estimated or the actual rates of infiltration or recruiting would obviously result in a different net loss or gain figure. This is still under study and may have been overtaken by recent events. As additional firm information becomes available, we will refine our estimates.

Question #11:

In your testimony before Armed Services you said that "any net increase in Communist strength during 1968 will have to come from North Vietnam." What is North Vietnam's current capacity to send down and absorb additional forces in South Vietnam? Would it be feasible for North Vietnam to provide supplies for an additional 100,000 men if she chose to send them down?

Does the Department believe that the recent widespread VC attacks will have any appreciable impact on VC recruiting" if so, how?

Answer:

It is estimated that North Vietnam has the capability to train 75,000 - 100,000 men a year for infiltration. By shortening current training cycles or increasing the number of units involved in the training of new recruits, this number could be substantially increased, possibly doubled, however, at this pace there would be considerable reduction in quality. Also, it would not permit organizing all of them into units and providing them with the necessary leadership.

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Question #11:

Answer continued:

NVN would have difficulties with internal distribution of supplies if 100,000 additional men were sent to South Vietnam and their dependence on supplies from external sources would sharply increase. However, we believe that the Communists would be able to meet the essential supply requirements for this increased force at the pre-Tet level of combat.

I believe that it is too early to determine the effect of the widespread enemy attacks on Viet Cong recruiting. In the final analysis, however, this will depend in large part on the psychological impact on the people and the efficacy of the South Vietnamese government's actions to offset it.

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FOR THE PRESS:

November 24, 1967

The following information was released by Headquarters, MACV, in Saigon at 0400 hours (EST) Friday, November 24, 1967.

MACV BRIEFING ON ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

A new study of the size of the enemy military and political structure in South Vietnam has been concluded. The study has been conducted by this headquarters working with other segments of the intelligence community.

We have re-examined in depth over a period of several months not only the strength of the enemy's organized military units, but also his guerrillas, his administrative services personnel and the Viet Cong political organization.

Intelligence data for some of these categories is much more difficult to collect than is the case for others.

For some time now there has been relatively good intelligence available on the enemy's regular combat elements -- his "hard core" of NVA units and Viet Cong main and local force units, but solid information upon which to base strength estimates for the guerrillas and the administrative services has only become available in recent months and this has made our new study possible. Information on the Viet Cong political infrastructure is also improved, although still spotty.

In 1965-1966, we aimed our collection mostly against the primary threat -- the enemy's hard core forces. We were forced to rely on broad

-2-

estimates for other categories, knowing that these estimates were based on inconclusive data.

The situation has now changed. Over the past eighteen months, we have improved the quality and the quantity of our intelligence collection programs for all categories. These improved programs, along with the documentation being uncovered by allied search and destroy operations ranging into areas of South Vietnam formerly considered as safe havens by the enemy, plus a marked improvement in quality and quantity of reports from the local populace, prisoners and increasing numbers of defectors, have enabled us to make a better estimate of the enemy's total military strength figures.

I want to emphasize that the new figures we are releasing today cannot and should not be compared with other than the hard core category of the figures we have been using. Although these older estimates were derived from the best information we had at that time, our new, expanded intelligence base has not only resulted in more accurate figures but has also shown us the areas of inaccuracy in our old estimates.

As a result, it is impossible to use the new figures to show that one category has risen or fallen in strength over the last six or twelve months. Except in the category of hard core forces, the old data was incorrect by virtue of being incomplete and founded on an inadequate base. What we have done is essentially to start over from a sound,

- 3 -

broader intelligence base.

I would like to describe to you today two basic categories of enemy strength figures---his armed forces and his political infrastructure.

The category of armed forces includes several subdivisions---regular forces (both North Vietnamese and Viet Cong), administrative services and guerrillas.

The political category includes only the political infrastructure.

Let me begin with the new order of battle for the enemy's armed forces, starting with his regular forces.

REGULAR FORCES

This category includes North Vietnamese Army units in South Vietnam and the Viet Cong main force and local force units.

The new estimates of the regular forces are essentially unchanged. We currently estimate a total of 118,000 regular forces opposing us. 54,000 of these are in North Vietnamese units, and 64,000 in Viet Cong main and local units. Of the latter, more than 10% are now North Vietnamese replacements, so that North Vietnamese now make up more than a majority of the manpower in the regular forces. As I said, our intelligence has been good on the enemy's regular elements and the new study confirms this. I might add that in retroactively adjusting our estimates of enemy regular strength as a result primarily of prisoner interrogation and captured documents, we now estimate that VC/NVA regular strength peaked at about 127,000 in

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September 1966, and has since declined slightly to the present figure.

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

The next category is administrative services, which comprises the personnel of military staffs from the national to the district level, as well as non-combat military support units directly subordinate to those staffs. As mentioned earlier, operations into former enemy safe havens and base areas have uncovered documentation of large numbers of these non-combat military people such as medical, personnel administrators, transportation and support elements.

Previously, we had no record of many of these. The old data indicated an estimated 25,000 in this category; our new estimates show that there are at least 35,000 to 40,000 full-time personnel. Let me re-emphasize that this does not mean an increase of 10,000 to 15,000 of the enemy in administrative services; it means simply that our intelligence data, while not firm today, is now better than it was in the past.

GUERRILLAS

The old intelligence data included an estimated 100,000 to 120,000 in a category of "Irregulars." It broke down these irregulars into three subdivisions---guerrillas, self-defense forces and secret self-defense forces. The old data divided the 100,000 to 120,000 irregulars roughly, putting one-third of them into the guerrilla subdivision and the other two-thirds into self-defense and/or secret self-defense personnel.

-5-

As I said, those were acknowledged as rough estimates at best. The Viet Cong guerrilla alone is a full-time fighter who is usually organized into platoons and squads. He sometimes operates in his own village or hamlet and is usually assigned to protect specific villages and hamlets. He collects taxes and conducts terrorist and sabotage activities. He is a definite part of the military threat and often operates in concert with the members of VC/NVA regular units in his assigned area, but he has not been as identifiable.

Information from the documents captured this year strongly suggests that the guerrilla forces have been considerably larger than we had believed. They probably totalled well over 100,000 a year ago and some captured VC documents suggest that the early 1966 guerrilla strength was in the 150,000 range. Our recent studies put the probable guerrilla strength today between 70,000 and 90,000. Again, it should be emphasized that these figures are not as firm as the figures for the regular forces.

Whereas the guerrillas are a definite "Military threat," our newest intelligence indicates that the other subdivisions in the old "irregular" total---the self-defense and secret self-defense forces---should not be considered part of the military order of battle.

Self-defense elements, operating at all levels from village to region, are home guards, primarily for the control and light defense of VC-held areas. They are fixed; they perform most of their duties part time; they include personnel of all ages, and they have a high percentage of females.

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Some are lightly armed; many are not armed at all. While they are a large element obviously available as a base for recruitment as well as for political and logistical support work, they are not a fighting force comparable to the guerrilla.

Secret self-defense forces are essentially low level fifth columnists, used for information collection. Although they cause some casualties and some damage, they do not represent a continual or dependable force and do not form a valid part of the enemy's military force. We have, therefore, removed them from the order of battle.

The old system, then attempted to break down the 100,000 to 120,000 irregulars into guerrillas and self-defense/secret self-defense forces. The new tabulation eliminates the broad irregular designation, estimates the number of guerrillas now to be between 70,000 and 90,000---actually a decline over a year ago---and removes from the order of battle the self-defense/secret self-defense estimate.

To sum up, we now estimate enemy armed forces in the following categories with the current strengths indicated:

1. Regular---118,000 (54,000 in NVA units and ~~plus~~ 64,000 in VC Main and Local units.)
 2. Administrative Services---35,000-40,000
 3. Guerrillas---70,000-90,000
- Total: 223,000-248,000

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VIET CONG POLITICAL CADRE

Now let me turn to the Viet Cong political structure---through which the enemy forces are directed, controlled and supported. These are the political cadre. They were previously included in the total enemy strength figures. From now on we will carry an estimate of these cadres, but they will not be carried as part of the total military strength.

I should also repeat that our data in this category is not as good as in the case of the military. We have already undertaken additional studies of the political infrastructure to give us a better understanding of how the political apparatus is organized, the missions of its component parts and their command relationship to each other. Obviously, some members of the infrastructure have more influence than others and are therefore more important pacification targets than others. In any case, we hope to have a better fix on the organization in the next few months. Once that is established, we will also have a better fix on its size.

The country team has developed the following working definition for this Viet Cong infrastructure: "The political and administrative organization through which the Viet Cong control or seek to control the Vietnamese people. It embodies the party (People's Revolutionary Party) control structure, which includes a command and administrative apparatus (Central Office for South Vietnam) which extends from the national level through the village level, and the leadership and administration of a

-8-

parallel front organization (National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam).

For a long time, we have carried a figure of 39,000-40,000 for this political infrastructure. This figure was based upon the GVN study from the early years of the war which went down only to the village level. Our increased intelligence now permits us to focus on the infrastructure in much more detail and we have modified that GVN estimate to a figure of 75,000 to 85,000. But this figure, while improved, is not considered at all solid. Hopefully, our estimates will improve as our studies continue over the next few months.

The function of the political cadre is not military. Therefore, we will no longer carry them in our military order of battle. However, the political organization, under orders from Hanoi, controls and directs all phases of the struggle, including the level of military operations. Therefore, they must not be overlooked as key elements who must be overcome along with the armed forces. We must consider them in enemy estimates, even though we have separated them out from the armed forces estimates.

RECAP

To sum up, our new, greatly broadened intelligence base has permitted a more realistic evaluation of enemy military and non-military strength.

The total enemy order of battle is now between 223,000 and 248,000.

We believe that this represents a decline in total enemy order of battle;

our retroactive analysis estimates the enemy order of battle strength to

have been approximately 285,000 in the July-September period of 1966.

As I mentioned, VG/NVA organized unit strength probably peaked at about 127,000 in September 1966 and has declined slightly.

Our estimate of the political cadre is 75-85,000.

In closing, I would like to restate two points once more:

First, the new study has not changed our estimate of the regular forces we face. They remain at about 118,000.

Secondly, in all other areas the new study has resulted in new figures. But these must not be considered increases or decreases from old figures. Since they are based on new data, they logically cannot be used in conjunction with old data for any firm comparisons of past and present enemy strengths.

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MACV Press Briefing & OB Problems

Package 3

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ENEMY STRENGTH HELD OVERSTATED

New Figures Indicate Total
Is Much Below 297,000

By TOM BUCKLEY
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Sept. 7.—New information gathered by intelligence officials indicates that enemy military strength in South Vietnam is much below the figure of 297,000 men heretofore thought to be in the country.

The intelligence community has nearly completed a full reassessment that is said to be based on captured documents, more productive interrogation of prisoners and the more accurate reports of an enlarged network of spies and informers.

As for the American forces, informed sources said the increase from the present strength of 464,000 men to the total of 525,000 authorized last month by President Johnson was expected to be completed well before the goal, June 30.

Troop strength will reach 475,000 in the next few months under a previous authorization. The additional men are scheduled to start arriving in December.

Four Units Chosen

The major units already announced as chosen for service in Vietnam are the 198th Light Infantry Brigade and two brigades of the 101st Airborne Division to join the brigade of the 101st that is already here.

In all, more than 20 infantry battalions will be added to the American force, as well as several helicopter battalions. The ratio of combat to support troops is expected to be considerably higher than the present ratio of 1 to 3.

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Some of these units will be in position in the III Corps area north of Saigon in time to undertake large-scale offensive action by the end of the current monsoon season at the end of the year.

Because of the stripping of the area of troops to reinforce the beleaguered marines in the I Corps area to the north, no multidivision operations have been undertaken there since the completion of Operation Junction City in April.

Enemy Decline Foreseen

Some military sources think that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese armed forces are on a long downward slide in which they will, slowly at first and then with greater rapidity, find themselves unable to make good their losses in men and supplies.

The figure of 297,000 enemy soldiers is regarded in military circles as being based more on guesswork than on facts.

For example, it includes 39,000 political workers. This total was arrived at by multiplying the 13,000 hamlets in South Vietnam by three, the number of men in each Vietcong organization and control team.

These cadres are not in any case primarily fighting men. In the same category are the administrative workers, estimated at 18,000.

North Vietnamese military strength in Vietnam is put at 55,000 and it is still regarded as a reasonably accurate estimate. More likely to be reduced are the estimates of 65,000 in the main Vietcong force and 120,000 local guerrillas.

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MACV Press Briefing & OB Problems

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19 April 68

Attrition of VC/NVA Forces in South Vietnam
First Quarter 1968

1. Main and Local Forces

The CIA methodology for estimating these forces consists of add-on adjustments to the MACV collateral OB. This OB already is adjusted for attrition. Thus, in effect, the CIA methodology accepts MACV's attrition of Main and Local Forces. Because we lack sufficient detail from MACV, we do not know exactly what gross monthly attrition to these forces is. We only know the net loss or gain for any given month. For February, for example, there was a net loss to these forces of 15,900.

When comparing 1 January 1968 and 31 March 1968 data, it must be remembered that manpower flows in the Main and Local Forces have been dynamic. The MACV estimate shows very heavy implied gross losses, balanced by heavy flows of new unit and filler NVA manpower. Behind the small net increase in these forces stands a very heavy gross loss.

2. Administrative Service Troops


We estimate that losses amongst these troops to be light, relative to the Main and Local and Guerrilla combat forces. For the first quarter we estimate that the net gain or loss to the Administrative Services category to be well within our estimative range of 60,000-80,000. Further, we estimate that the loss to

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these troops was probably made up by new NVA Administrative Service troops associated with the movement into South Vietnam of new combat units.

3. Guerrillas

We are most uncertain of how to handle attrition to this element. We note MACV is also very uncertain on this. In addition to attrition, the uncertainty extends to the problem of estimating recruitment into the Guerrillas and upgrading out of the Guerrillas. Both of the latter estimates were sizable in our view. To reflect these uncertainties, and to acknowledge that some net losses probably occurred, we reduced the top end of our range by 10,000 and estimated guerrilla forces at the end of the quarter to be between 80-110,000.

4. Self Defense and Assault Youth

The estimates for Self Defense and Assault Youth are sufficiently soft and ranged to contain any short term net changes. There was obviously some attrition, but this has been balanced by new recruiting.

5. Political Infrastructure

Although CIA does not have sufficient data to quantify the attrition of the Political Infrastructure, the judgments presented by MACV seem to be reasonable enough to warrant our concurrence in a net attrition of 5,000.



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
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[] DIA: [] said he had been asked by Gen. Brown to relay that DIA's move to our figures on ^S~~P~~(Political) and ^B~~E~~(Other) is a provisional move; Gen. Brown is going along in the hope that his move would prompt CIA to do some accommodating in A(Combat Forces).

Further, General Brown wants us to know that if there is no accommodation in A then DIA will go with MACV all the way.

In reacting to this Gen. Brown would like us to remember that "nobody knows for certain what the answer is." Brown would also want CIA to know that the present set of numbers is the best that DIA's analytical organization can support.



17 April 1968

Estimates of Organized Enemy^{a/}
Strengths in South Vietnam
(31 March 1968)

(In Thousands)

A. Military Forces

VC/NVA Main and Local	135-145	123-133	128-143 (123-133)
Administrative Services	75-100	30-40	45-60 (30-40)
Guerrillas	90-100	50-70	50-70
Sub-total	<u>300-355</u>	<u>203-243</u>	<u>223-273</u>

B. Other Irregular Elements

6

Assault Youth	10-20	Not	130-160
Self Defense	100-150	Quantified	
Sub-total	<u>110-170</u>	<u>-----</u>	<u>130-160</u>

C. Political Infrastructure

Professional Cadre	8-90	75-85 Not	75-85
Supporting Staffs	10-30	Quantified	-----
Sub-total	<u>90-120</u>	<u>75-85</u>	<u>75-85</u>
TOTAL	<u>500-645</u>	<u>278-328</u>	<u>428-518</u>

^{a/} This table should be read with the same caveats carried in the footnotes to Table 1.

16 April 1968

Estimates of Organized Enemy
Strengths in South Vietnam
(1 January 1968)

(In Thousands)

A. Military Force

VC/NVA Main and Local Forces ^{a/}	130-140	120-130	125-140
Administrative Services ^{b/}	75-100	35-40	50-60
Guerrillas	110-120	70-80	70-80 ^{c/}
Sub-total ^{d/}	<u>315-360</u>	<u>225-250</u>	<u>245-280</u>

B. Other Irregular Elements

Assault Youth	10-20	Not	130-160 ^{e/}
Self Defense	100-150	Quantified	
Political Support			
Sub-total ^{d/}	<u>110-170</u>	<u>-----</u>	<u>130-160</u>

C. Political Infrastructure

Professional Cadre	80-90	80-90	80-90
Supporting Staffs	10-30	Not	----- ^{f/}
		Quantified	
Sub-total ^{d/}	<u>90-120</u>	<u>80-90</u>	<u>80-90</u>
TOTAL	<u>515-620</u> ⁶⁵⁰	<u>305-340</u>	<u>455-530</u>

- a/ The CIA and the MACV/CINCPAC estimates do not include Main and Local forces that have not previously been picked up as part of the in-country threat. The DIA estimate includes 5,000 to 10,000 NVA troops located out of country. *clear whether these are a part* It is not of the external threat ~~as~~ a part of the in-country forces temporarily deployed out-of-country.
- b/ The CIA estimate includes 10,000-20,000 troops located out-of-country but subordinate to in-country ^{or} ~~on~~ border area headquarters in direct command of the fighting in South Vietnam. The MACV estimates out-of-country similarly defined with the exception of those in the DMZ area. The DIA estimate includes 15,000-20,000 troops out of country and not subordinate to border area commands.
- c/ The DIA, estimate allows for the possiblitiy of additional guerrillas under "B,Other Irregular Elements," see note e.
- d/ Sub totals not comparable because of different coverage in all three cases.
- e/ This is a composite figure which includes some *g* guerrillas, not included as part of military forces, Assault ^h ~~Yout~~, Self Defense, and Full time support personnel in the Political Infrastructure. DIA is unable to make an allocation of these numbers by type.
- f/ An unknown number of these personnel are included in the DIA estimate for
- Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000200190001-7**
- B. Other Irregular Elements.

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1 April 1968

Communist Force Structure
 in South Vietnam
 (29 February 1968)

	<u>US MACV</u>	<u>CIA</u>
Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army		
Main and Local Forces	122,900	145,000-150,000
Viet Cong	40,900- 38,900	45,000- 50,000
North Vietnamese Army	82,000- 84,000	About 100,000
Guerrillas	47,500	90,000-110,000
Administrative Service	33,700	75,000-100,000
Sub-Total	<u>204,100</u>	<u>310,000-360,000</u>
Self Defense Militia	---*	100,000
Assault Youth	---**	15,000
Political/Economic Infrastructure	84,000	80,000-100,000
Total	<u>288,100</u>	<u>505,000-575,000</u>

*US MACV has not provided an estimate of this element since September 1967.

**US MACV has not estimated this element.

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27 March 1968

Order of Battle vs. Estimate of Strength

Although the terms "order of battle" and "estimate of enemy strength" have tended to be used interchangeably, they do in fact represent two quite different concepts, with two quite different results.

An order of battle is compiled according to specific procedures and rules about specific types of evidence concerning the "acceptance" of enemy units as "confirmed", "probable", and "possible." Because of these rules and procedures, and the time needed to acquire evidence, the order of battle calculations are likely to lag behind the actual changes in enemy strength. Depending on the direction of change, the order of battle may be higher or lower. In fact, some substantial number of the enemy units may permanently escape listing in the order of battle if they remain inaccessible to the types of sources which are relied upon to furnish evidence which meets the criteria for "acceptance." Inevitably an order of battle tends to be an incomplete historical record of the enemy troop list.

An estimate of enemy strength is based on all types of evidence, including that used in order of battle calculations, but also including fragmentary information that would not qualify in OB calculations. An estimate not only includes the best judgment which can be made as to current enemy strength, but also projects any future changes which the evidence suggests. ^{New} Estimates are produced on a subject whenever there is a good reason to believe that previous estimates on the subject have become substantially incorrect or out of date. The reliability of estimates is, in part, a reflection of the completeness and validity of the data base, and the trends suggested by it, but the estimator must proceed regardless of the status of the data base. Estimating procedure respects the rules of evidence, follows logical reasoning processes, and indicates the degree of confidence which can be assigned to the conclusions.

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Paul --					
I don't know the degree to which MACV and DIA OB statements are based on the traditional OB rules. If they really use these rules, the distinction described in the attached should be very useful to you. If not, forget it.					
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ADDI 7E44				28 Mar	

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19 March 1968

The Communists' Ability to Recoup Their Tet Military Losses

Introduction

1. This study examines enemy force strengths committed to the Tet offensive and losses sustained and attempts to place this attrition in perspective. In the following paragraphs, the available intelligence is presented together with observations and judgments concerning the size of the enemy forces committed and attrition sustained. The total size of the enemy's organized manpower base -- the backdrop necessary to put this attrition into perspective -- is also considered. Finally, the problem of the enemy's ability to recoup his losses through recruitment, upgrading, and infiltration is addressed.

Tet Losses and Participating Strengths

2. The examination makes use of enemy killed-in-action (KIA) reported by the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (US MACV) from the period 30 January through 21 February -- some 38,600 men. This period covered the mass urban attacks and the "second round" on 18-19 February, as well as its immediate aftermath. The fighting since 21 February has been excluded on the grounds that, although enemy losses have continued heavy, they have been overall at a more "normal" level for the war.

3. The examination is based on the judgment that roughly 80,000 enemy were involved in the attacks. This includes North Vietnamese (NVA) units and main and local forces of about 60,000. (This latter figure was reached

independently in a CIA analysis* and is also roughly accepted by most OB authorities who have studied the offensive, including the US MACV.) The additional 20,000 men are an estimate of the number of guerrillas who participated in the urban phase of the offensive.

Table I

Strength of Participating Communist Forces
in the Tet Attacks

	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
Total	77,000	100
NVA	21,600	27.8
VC Main Force	16,800	21.6
VC Local Force	19,300	24.9
Guerrillas	20,000	25.7

4. There is good evidence of extensive guerrilla participation. Captured documents have now provided detailed planning for the attacks in a few provinces. These suggest that the enemy hoped to use from one-half to two-thirds of his guerrilla force in an offensive role of some kind. It appears that about 20,000 guerrillas actually participated in the urban attacks. The remainder were used in various offensive roles in rural areas.

5. The dilemma with respect to the casualties arises when the reported enemy KIA (38,600) is considered against the total offensive force

*See ER IM 68-23, Communist Units Participating in Attacks During the Tet Offensive, 30 January Through 13 February 1968, 21 February 1968, SECRET.

estimated to have been involved -- about 80,000. This would suggest that approximately one-half of the attacking force was killed in the offensive and its aftermath. This is difficult to accept, however, given the post-action reports on the status of some enemy units and the subsequent level of enemy activity throughout the country. Casualties for this period are more difficult to reconcile when an estimate for wounded is taken into account. Even if the standard, conservative factor of .35 for dies of wounds or permanently disabled is applied for every KIA, over 13,000 more men are added to the losses. The total casualties computed in this conservative manner, would be nearly two-thirds of our strength estimate of those involved in the attacks. If the 1.5 to 1 ratio of wounded to killed in action is applied, the resultant casualty total exceeds the forces committed.

Possible Non-Military Casualties

6. Assuming that the KIA figure itself is accurate, it almost certainly must include a substantial proportion of other organizational elements of the enemy apparatus and non-participating civilians who happened to be caught in the urban battle areas. US military officials in Vietnam agree that some are probably included. In addition, it is known that the Communists made a major effort in the few months prior to Tet to fill up their regular and guerrilla force ranks and to recruit laborers for logistic support. Many of the POW's from the offensive were individuals virtually taken from street corners and pressed into the attacks by the enemy. Eye-witnesses, moreover, report that large numbers of civilian-type personnel

were used as "shock troops" in many of the urban assaults. Military conflict in urban areas normally produces high civilian casualties; interrogations and captured documents indicate that large numbers of civilian laborers were used in the Tet offensive. Considered in this light, it would not be unreasonable for casualties to persons outside the regular and guerrilla force structure to represent a substantial share of total losses.

The Enemy's Manpower Base

7. Therefore, in assessing the effect of the high reported Tet casualties on the enemy's force structure, it is necessary to consider the enemy's total organized manpower base -- the total that could be expected to make some military contribution and take casualties. For this reason, enemy militia, assault youth, and even political infrastructure are included as sources for troop replacement, as casualty recipients, and as part of the remaining Communist threat.

8. The organized enemy manpower base in South Vietnam prior to Tet and following an extensive recruiting drive sets up approximately as follows:

Table II

Estimated Communist Organized Manpower Base
as of 30 January 1968

VC/NVA Main and Local Forces	160,000
Guerrillas	100,000-120,000
Administrative Services	75,000-100,000
Self-defense Militia	100,000
Political Cadre	80,000-120,000
Assault Youth	<u>15,000</u>
	530,000-615,000

VC/NVA Main and Local Forces

9. Main Forces are those military units directly subordinate to COSVN or a VC Military Region or Subregion. NVA units in SVN are counted as Main Forces, although technically, some of these units are directly subordinate to command entities in NVN. Local Forces are defined as those military units directly subordinate to a provincial or district party committee and normally operate only within a specified VC province or district. There were about 160,000 Communist Main and Local Forces in SVN on 30 January 1968. This total includes MACV's January order of battle base figure of 115,000, plus an estimate of troops missing from the OB due to MACV's accounting procedures.

Administrative Service

10. MACV defines the "Administrative Service" troops as "military personnel in identified COSVN, military region, military subregion, province, and district staffs, and rear service technical units of all types directly subordinate to these headquarters." As of 31 December 1967 MACV's OB held 37,725 such soldiers in South Vietnam. There are two principle reasons why this estimate is too low. Captured documents indicate that there are many more service troops at each echelon than carried in the MACV December OB. On balance, 75-100,000 is a more reasonable estimate of the number of administrative service troops.

Guerrillas

11. Guerrillas are Viet Cong soldiers subordinate to the villages (full time and well armed) and hamlets (part time and fairly well armed)

in South Vietnam. They are the military arm of the party at the local level responsible for the defense of VC controlled hamlets and villages. They also engage in harassment and sabotage raids and attacks on GVN posts and hamlets. Prior to Tet and before the upgrading of about 20,000 guerrillas, there were 110,000 to 120,000 guerrillas in South Vietnam.

Militia

12. The Militia or Self-defense force is essentially a poorly armed part time hamlet labor force whose primary function is the construction and preparation of defense positions and combat hamlets and villages. They participate in combat only in defense of their hamlets or as members of a labor force. The present size of the militia is probably on the order of 100,000.

Political OB

13. MACV defines the Viet Cong infrastructure as "the political and administrative organization through which the Viet Cong control or seek to control the South Vietnamese people. It embodies the party (People's Revolutionary Party) control structure, and the leadership and administration of a parallel front organization (National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam), both of which extend from the national through the hamlet level." It is estimated that the number of people belonging to the infrastructure -- as defined by US MACV -- is on the order of 80-120,000.

Assault Youth

14. The Assault Youth is a partially armed combat support organization whose main function is battlefield logistics and casualty evacuation.

A document dated September 1966 indicates that at this time the number of Assault Youth was about 15,000. Due to the increased importance of the Assault Youth and the reported formation of new Assault Youth companies, 15,000 is believed to be a conservative estimate of total strength.

15. Viewed numerically against a 530-615,000 base, the enemy's losses, particularly in terms of main and local force strength, could be relatively insignificant as a long-term problem. It would seem reasonable that, if the Communists have managed in the past to maintain an organized manpower base of the size postulated in Table II, they could recoup their Tet losses in a relatively short period of time, both by recruitment-conscription into the lower level military elements, and by upgrading to the regular forces from the lower level units.

The Replacement Campaign

16. There is abundant evidence that the Communists are now making a strenuous effort to recoup their losses and, in fact, to raise their overall military force strength above the pre-Tet levels. Reports from South Vietnam's countryside indicate that the enemy has been recruiting heavily in all four corps areas, particularly in the populous Delta and northern lowlands. Moreover, this recruitment has often taken the form of coerced conscription -- a policy designed to provide the maximum number of recruits in the shortest possible period of time.

17. There is little question that the Tet offensive has opened a new recruitment base to the Viet Cong in the South Vietnamese countryside. A declining recruitment pool because of refugee movement to GVN-held areas

was partially responsible for VC recruitment shortfalls in 1967. The new pool, consisting of the populations of hamlets in the countryside where the VC formerly have had little or no influence, can be expected to boost 1968 recruitment greatly. New-found influence in rural areas -- if only in the form of increased popular respect for VC power -- will permit VC recruiters easy access to hamlets and a ready audience of youths.

18. The intensity of the current recruiting drive, the availability of manpower, and the current freedom of the enemy in formerly contested and even some secure areas of the country, all add to the impression that the Communists will be able to replace their losses numerically in a relatively short period of time. Prior to the Tet offensive, enemy recruitment was estimated by US MACV at between 3-5,000 a month. It is now clear, however that this rate had shot up in the months immediately preceding Tet. In view of the current enemy recruiting drive and access to the countryside, it does not seem improbable that they can at least double this rate to between 6,000 and 10,000 men a month, at least over the short term. At such a rate, it would take the Communists no more than six months, at a maximum, to replace their reported KIA losses during the Tet offensive.

19. This computation, of course, does not take into account the "normal" Communist losses since 21 February, or the future losses during the recuperation period. Over a six-month time frame, such losses could perhaps double the total replacement necessary. During certain periods within the past year, for example, Communist losses have run at a rate of around 4,000 men per month. On the other hand, the replacement rate

described above for the Tet losses does not take into account the continuing infiltration of manpower from North Vietnam into the South. This has been running at a rate of about 5,000 to 6,000 men a month on the average during the past year and conceivably could offset the additional combat losses during the Tet recovery period. Infiltration would clearly tend, over a six-month period, at least, to offset NVA unit losses in South Vietnam.

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22 May 1973

MEMORANDUM

CIA and MACV Estimates of Communist Forces
in South Vietnam as of 1 January 1968

The attached table presents CIA and MACV estimates of Communist forces in South Vietnam on 1 January 1968. Column 1 shows the original pre-1968 Order of Battle Conference CIA estimates, which reflect Sam Adams' position, while Column 2 portrays the revised CIA estimates resulting from discussions at the Conference; and Column 3 indicates the current estimates of the number of those forces at that time. Columns 4 and 5 are MACV's original and current estimates of Communist forces for the same date.

In retrospect, the CIA estimates are generally closer to what we now believe the actual number of Communist forces in South Vietnam were on 1 January 1968. Since the 1968 Order of Battle Conference, both CIA and MACV have revised upward their overall estimates of Communist forces in South Vietnam by some 12 percent. This resulted from the receipt of additional information, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] which permitted further analysis and refinement of estimative procedures. Interestingly, MACV's current estimate of regular VC/NVA combat forces in-country on that

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date is now roughly at the mid-point of the CIA Conference estimate.

Despite the similar overall percentage increase in Communist forces, there are significant differences between CIA and MACV on the retroactive revision of the individual categories of forces for the period. The largest increase occurred in the estimates of regular combat forces, where the CIA figure now exceeds the pre-1968 Conference estimate. This revision resulted from VC/NVA documents and prisoners captured during 1968-69, which revealed higher average unit strengths than previously estimated for the period. The CIA administrative services estimate made at the Conference was subsequently increased by one-quarter to the pre-Conference level as the result of information obtained from the Allied cross-border operations in mid-1970 -- which demonstrated a support force of that size. While MACV similarly raised its estimate by nearly one-third, it still is well below the CIA figure. The increased guerrilla estimate also reflects additional captured data, as well as in-depth research to further refine the estimate. There has been no change in the original estimate of self defense forces and assault youths because of the almost complete lack of data on those forces since 1968. The downward revision in CIA's number of personnel in the political infrastructure (VCI) reflects further analysis on the subject. Differences

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between the CIA and MACV estimates on the VCI have always revolved around the question of who should be counted as VCI, with CIA using a broader definition than MACV.

OER/S/MA

Comparative CIA and MACV Estimates of VC/NVA Military
Forces in South Vietnam
1 January 1968
(in thousands)

	CIA			MACV	
	Original 1968 Pre-Conference Estimates	Revised 1968 Conference Estimates	Current Estimates	Original 1968 Estimates	Current Estimates
Regular Combat Forces	158-164	120-140	165-185	115	132
Administrative Services	75-100	60-80	75-100	38	50
Guerrillas	110-120	80-120	100-125	72	81
Self Defense Forces	100	80-120	80-120	a/	a/
Assault Youths	10-20	10-20	10-20	b/	b/
Political Infrastructure	90-120	90-120	80-100	84	84
Total	<u>543-624</u>	<u>440-600</u>	<u>510-650</u>	<u>309</u>	<u>347</u>

a. MACV did not quantify these forces for 1 January 1968. It felt that they did not constitute a real military threat to Allied forces because they were organized on a part-time basis, only partially armed and poorly trained. A September 1967 study by MACV on self defense forces, however, estimated their total number at about 120,000 -- a figure used as the upper-end of the CIA range.

b. Not considered a military threat and therefore not quantified.

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End 1966 we are using MACV figures
for combat forces and an
independent OSD estimate
of irregulars:

	<u>1964</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>66</u>
	91.8 - 200,000	110-300	110-300

Adams NW-17

A late 1966 Adams, ^{draft} study saying
the number of VC irregulars in
1966 was 250-300,000

14.3-67

Adams

Regular Forces	118,000	
Admin Services	35-40,000	double
Guerrillas	70-90,000	120-150,000
Infrastructure	no number	100,000
Assault Youth	" "	no number
Self Defense/Secret Self Def	no est.	100 Self Def 20 Secret Self Def

Total 223-248,000 > 500,000

Adams note (9 Nov 67) re 14.3-47

Irregulars -- should be doubled
1966 = 200-300,000 (1 Sept 67 - Mar
can reach 185,000)

informal CIA study of Jan 67 suggested
304,000 ^{irregulars} as of Aug 1966

Guerrillas - 150,000 a plausible estimate
for early 67.

Adams would raise maximum
numbers to 120,000 - ie 70-90,000 should be 70-120,000

Political NIE gave no numbers.

Adams would say at least 100,000

Self Defense - Adams would say 100,000 plus
24,000 in direct Self-Def.

numbers of Viet Cong is something over half a million

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23 May 1973

MRMORANDUM

Estimates of Khmer Communist Military
Forces (KC) in Cambodia

1. Following are the benchmark estimates of KC military forces as presented by Mr. Samuel Adams and by OER. The Adams' data has been gathered together from several sources, including unpublished memoranda, newspaper reports and direct conversations with Mr. Adams. The OER data has appeared in various CIA published memoranda.

	<u>Adams</u>		<u>OER</u>	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Regular Combat</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Regular Combat</u>
Early 1971	100,000	40,000	5,000-10,000	*
Nov 1971	150,000	50,000	*	15,000-30,000
Apr 1973	200,000	60,000 to 80,000	*	40,000-50,000

* Not quantified. Prior to 1971, OER estimates of the KC force structure were obtained from [] and purported to include all military forces. Since mid-1971, OER has made estimates of the KC regular combat forces only.

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2. We reconstruct the chronology of these estimates as follows: An OER memorandum drafted for the Attorney General on 13 January 1971* presented the 5,000 to 10,000 estimate. Mr. Adams, learning of this estimate, drafted a working paper entitled "The Question of the Khmer Communist Order of Battle", which he circulated in mid-1971. This report estimated the total KC military strength at over 100,000 men. OER agreed that the 5,000 to 10,000 man estimate was probably too low. Accordingly, in August 1971 OER initiated a research project on the KC military structure. Early in the project it became clear that the lack of information on the KC would limit OER estimates of the KC military structure to KC regular combat forces only. The results of this project, published in October and November**, concluded that there were between 15,000 and 30,000 regular KC combat forces in Cambodia. In a December 1971 memorandum for the record, Mr. Adams attacked the OER estimate: First, because by definition it excluded guerrilla/militia, second, because he claimed that the estimate of regular combat forces was too low. He estimated that there were

* See OER S-3465 "Strength and Disposition of Communist Forces in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, 1967-1970".

** See OER S-3891 "Communist Force Levels in Indochina", 29 October 1971 and OER IM 71-218 "Khmer Communist Combat Forces in Cambodia", November 1971.

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a total of 150,000 KC including at least 50,000 in regular combat units. The next OER estimate of the KC regular combat forces appeared in February 1973 in "The Situation in Cambodia, January 1973". In this document, which drew upon a large body of new information, the KC regular combat forces were estimated at 40,000 to 50,000 men. Most recently, Mr. Adams, in The New York Times of 18 May 1973, presented the total KC military strength as being on the order of 200,000 men. Conversations with him prior to the Times article indicated that he thought that 60,000 to 80,000 men of the 200,000 total were regular combat forces.

3. The differences between the estimates produced by OER and those of Mr. Adams result basically from differing approaches to order of battle estimating. Mr. Adams has long contended that the methodology used by OER -- which requires what we consider to be appropriate evidential support -- produces low order of battle estimates (not only for Cambodia but also for South Vietnam and Laos). Mr. Adams, on the other hand, has traditionally been satisfied with much less rigorous evidence to support his estimative procedures. This difference can be most clearly demonstrated by the case

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of the KC guerrilla/militia in Cambodia. OER has found no acceptable way to estimate these forces, in view of the very sketchy information base. Mr. Adams, in contrast, estimates guerrilla strength by using a formula which says, in effect, that 3% of all the Khmer population under Communist control is the guerrilla/militia force. This percentage derives from Mr. Adams' analysis of the Communist guerrilla/militia in Laos, where he estimated the Pathet Lao guerrilla/militia comprised about 6% of the Communist-controlled population. Mr. Adams reduced the 6% to 3% for Cambodia, declaring that the KC had probably done about half as well as the Pathet Lao in recruiting its own guerrilla/militia. We felt that this analogical approach was inappropriate for Cambodia for several reasons, not the least of which derived from the fact that, at the time, the insurgency was largely a Vietnamese enterprise which would have only limited appeal to Khmer peasants. This latter judgment was based on our view of the traditional ethnic animosity between the Khmer and Vietnamese and the fact that the KC political structure contained large numbers of Vietnamese.

OER/S/MA

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Comparative CIA and MACV Estimates of VC/NVA
Military Forces in South Vietnam
1 January 1968
(in thousands)

	<u>Original 1968 Pre- Conference Estimates</u>		<u>1968 Post-Conference Estimates</u>	
	<u>CIA</u>	<u>MACV^{a/}</u>	<u>CIA</u>	<u>MACV</u>
Regular Combat Forces	143-149	115	120-140	120-130
Administrative Services	75-100	38	60-80	35-40
Guerrillas	110-120	72	80-120	70-80
Self Defense Forces	80-120	<u>b/</u>	80-120	<u>b/</u>
Assault Youths	10-20	<u>c/</u>	10-20	<u>c/</u>
Political Infrastructure	90-120	84	90-120	80-90
Total	<u>508-629</u>	<u>309</u>	<u>440-600</u>	<u>305-340</u>

a. Taken from the CICV Order of Battle published for January 1968, which essentially represents MACV's pre-conference position. At the April Conference, however, MACV stated that their figures on regular combat forces for 1 January had been retroactively adjusted slightly upward to nearly 119,000 troops in light of new information.

b. MACV did not quantify these forces for 1 January 1968. It felt that they did not constitute a real military threat to Allied forces because they were organized on a part-time basis, only partially armed and poorly trained. A September 1967 study by MACV on self defense forces, however, estimated their total number at about 120,000 -- a figure used as the upper end of the CIA range.

c. Not considered a military threat and therefore not quantified.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: ADDI

As you suspected, the preliminary OER Conference presentation of 158-164,000 combat troops was for 31 January, not 1 January.*

Attached table presents the CIA and MAC/V numbers for 1 January.



Chief
Southeast Asia Division

* (Just a footnote: Sam may be using the 31 January numbers in his polemics.)

24 May 73
(DATE)

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24 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, East Asia Division, DDO

SUBJECT : Khmer Communist Order of Battle

Attached is our response to your 21 May 1973 request for information concerning OER's estimate of the Khmer Communist Forces in Cambodia. I hope this memorandum proves useful in the implementation of your

and if we can be of further assistance, please let us know.

Chief
Southeast Asia Division
Office of Economic Research

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24 May 1973

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MEMORANDUM

Khmer Communist Order of Battle

1. Khmer Communist (KC) regular combat strength is currently estimated to be about 40,000 to 50,000 men. About 30,000 of these troops are operating in regimental and battalion-sized units, while independent companies and platoons are estimated to have a combined strength of 10,000 to 20,000 (See the attached Order of Battle listing).

2. The listing of KC units is the end result of the on-going analysis of all-source information.

Secondarily, PWs and ralliers have proved a valuable source of information.

Because of [] lackluster performance, however, a relatively small number of Communists have fallen into friendly hands, thus restricting the volume of information

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obtained. Moreover, the PW/rallier processing capability, compared to that previously available in Vietnam, is meager. By the same token, very few captured documents have been made available. Agent reporting is a useful input, but because it is somewhat less reliable, it normally cannot be used as a primary source. The same generally holds true for [] which usually exaggerates the enemy threat.

3. The analysis of KC order of battle is based on accepted standards used for some time in estimating enemy order of battle in Vietnam and Laos. The acceptance of a new unit into the order of battle is usually based on at least two independent sources []

[] although a single source is occasionally accepted when it is estimated to be of sufficient reliability. Previously accepted units are deleted if reliable information is obtained indicating that they have been disbanded or if no reports concerning them have been received over an extended period (usually at least one year).

4. The strength and location of a unit are based on an analysis of information detailed by the various sources. If no strength is given, one is assigned based on a study of

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the average strength reported for similar units. To avoid the double entry of a unit, several techniques are employed. Unit listings sorted by KC Military Region (MR), [] and unit designator are searched for units with the same or similar designators. In the case of newly identified regiments, which normally are formed from already observed battalions, unidentified battalions are carried as subordinates when the composition of the regiment is not known. These unidentified battalions are not entered in the maneuver battalion count. Thus, although total manpower strength may be very slightly inflated, duplication in the total number of battalions is avoided. When information is received detailing the regiment's subordinates, the proper unit designators are entered, and the battalions are picked up in the battalion count.

5. The estimated strength of KC companies and platoons is based on analysis of the structure of KC administrative districts and strengths reported for individual units. The strength is ranged because of the uncertainty surrounding the number of districts administered by the KC which have district units. Thus, the lower end of the range represents the minimum extent of KC control, while the upper end represents the maximum.

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6. Throughout the analytical process, close contact is maintained with DIA, which co-sponsors this estimate. In addition, the views of DAO, Phnom Penh, ARPAC and other interested parties are taken into account, although they do not necessarily subscribe to this estimate.

OER/S/MA

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MEMORANDUM FOR: ADDI

info copy
Attached was requested by Chief,
DDO/~~EA~~, as background information on KC
order of battle estimating.


Chief
Southeast Asia Division

25 May 73
(DATE)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY/DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ORDER OF BATTLE OF KHMER COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES
CAMBODIA

LISTED BY ☐ MILITARY REGION
22 MAY 1973

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MACV Press Briefing & OB Problems

Package 5

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000200190001-7

VIETNAM AFFAIRS STAFF

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP78T02095

00190001-7

DATE: 10 Oct 67

TO: DBL, D/OCI, D/ONE, D/OER

FROM: GACarver, Jr.

SUBJECT: MACV's OB Briefing

REMARKS:

1. Attached is a memorandum from Assistant Secretary Goulding's office transmitting a draft briefing on enemy order of battle to be given by the MACV PIO. Mr. Goulding, through me, has asked for the Director's comments on this draft.

2. Would you please have your offices look this over carefully. I would appreciate having your comments by 1500, Wednesday, 11 October, so that I may raise this with the Director and give him our coordinated views on Wednesday afternoon.

George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment
A/S

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ACTION

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

OCT 10 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CIA

Attention: Mr. George Carver

SUBJECT: MACV Press Briefing on Enemy Order of Battle

1. A proposed press briefing on enemy order of battle has been developed over the past few weeks; MACV, CIA, DIA and OASD(PA) have been involved. The plan is for MACV to surface these new estimates in a press briefing in Saigon within the next ten days or so.
2. We have just completed several exchanges of messages with Hq MACV, and the attached briefing (Incl. 1) is satisfactory to ASD(PA), COMUSMACV, and Ambassador Komer.
3. At Inclosure 2 are listed the old enemy figures for uniform use in Saigon and Washington in answering press queries.
4. Request your comment or concurrence.
5. Following your concurrence, Secretary Goulding will take the matter up with Secretary McNamara. After final approval here in Washington, the text will be relayed to MACV and an agreed upon date for the briefing will be established.

Daniel Z. Henkin

Daniel Z. Henkin
Deputy Assistant Secretary

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DOD DIR 5200.10

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OASD(PA) Control No.

MACV BRIEFING ON ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

A new study of the size of the enemy military and political structure in South Vietnam has been concluded. The study has been conducted by this headquarters working with other segments of the intelligence community.

We have re-examined in depth over a period of several months not only the strength of the enemy's organized military units, but also his guerrillas, his administrative services personnel and the Viet Cong political organization.

Intelligence data for some of these categories is much more difficult to collect than is the case for others.

For some time now there has been relatively good intelligence available on the enemy's regular combat elements --- his "hard core" of NVA units and Viet Cong main and local force units. But solid information upon which to base strength estimates for the guerrillas and the administrative services has only become available in recent months and this has made our new study possible. Information on the Viet Cong political infrastructure is also improved, although still spotty.

In 1965-1966, we aimed our collection mostly against the primary threat---the enemy's hard core forces. We were forced to rely on broad estimates for other categories, knowing that these estimates were based on inconclusive data.

The situation has now changed. Over the past eighteen months, we have improved the quality and the quantity of our intelligence collection programs for all categories. These improved programs, along with the documentation being uncovered by allied search and destroy operations ranging into areas of South Vietnam formerly considered as safe havens by the enemy, plus a marked improvement in quality and quantity of reports from the local populace, prisoners and increasing numbers of defectors, have enabled us to make a better estimate of the enemy's total military strength figures.

I want to emphasize that the new figures we are releasing today cannot and should not be compared with other than the hard core category of the figures we have been using. Although these older estimates were derived from the best information we had at that time, our new, expanded intelligence base has not only resulted in more accurate figures but has also shown us the areas of inaccuracy in our old estimates.

As a result, it is impossible to use the new figures to show that one category has risen or fallen in strength over the last six or twelve months. Except in the category of hard core forces, the old data was incorrect by virtue of being incomplete and founded on an inadequate base. What we have done is essentially to start over from a sound, broader intelligence base.

I would like to describe to you today two basic categories of enemy strength figures. The first category is the armed forces and the political infrastructure.

SECRET

The category of armed forces includes several subdivisions--- regular forces (both North Vietnamese and Viet Cong), administrative services and guerrillas.

The political category includes only the political infrastructure.

Let me begin with the new order of battle for the enemy's armed forces, starting with his regular forces.

REGULAR FORCES

This category includes North Vietnamese Army units in South Vietnam and the Viet Cong main force and local force units.

The new estimates of the regular forces are essentially unchanged. We currently estimate 53,000 NVA forces and 65,000 VC main and local forces, for a total of 118,000 regular forces opposing us. As I said, our intelligence has been good on the enemy's regular elements and the new study confirms this. I might add that in retroactively adjusting our estimates of enemy regular strength as a result primarily of prisoner interrogation and captured documents, we now estimate that VC/NVA regular strength peaked at 127,500 in September 1966, and has since declined slightly to the present figure.

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

The next category is administrative services, which comprises the personnel of military staffs from the national to the district level, as well as non-combat military support units directly subordinate to

those staffs. As mentioned earlier, operations into former enemy safe havens and base areas have uncovered documentation of large numbers of these non-combat military people such as medical, personnel administrators, transportation and support elements.

Previously, we had no record of many of these; the old data indicated an estimated 25,000 in this category. Our new estimates show between 35,000 to 40,000 full-time personnel. Let me re-emphasize that this does not mean an increase of 10,000 to 15,000 of the enemy in administrative services; it means simply that our intelligence data today is better than it was in the past.

GUERRILLAS

Our former intelligence data consistently included an estimated 100,000 to 120,000 in the guerrilla-irregular category. This figure was assumed to consist of full-time guerrillas and other armed irregulars. Our new data base indicated clearly that we included a large number of individuals in the old estimate who could lay no valid claim to this category. Also, we now know that many of those we so classified do not carry arms and fall more properly in the fifth column, fellow traveller, or political infrastructure category. For our current estimate, if they pose a military threat, we count them as guerrillas; if they are associated with political cadre operations, we count them in the infrastructure; if they are merely potential fifth columnists or actual or alleged Viet Cong sympathizers, we count them as fifth columnists or Viet Cong supporters.

in any particular category.

Based on current knowledge, we categorize a Viet Cong guerrilla as a usually full-time fighter who is normally organized into platoons and squads. He sometimes operates in or near his own village or hamlet and is usually assigned to protect specific villages and hamlets. He collects taxes and conducts terrorist and sabotage activities. He is a definite part of the military threat and often operates in concert with the members of VC/NVA regular units in his assigned area. However, we have considerable documentary evidence that not even all the guerrillas have individual arms.

As I mentioned earlier, information from the documents captured this year strongly suggests that the genuine guerrilla forces were larger in the past than we thought. However, their current strength is clearly down to between 70,000 and 90,000 with strong indications that the actual figure is closer to the lower than the higher limits of the estimate.

To sum up, we now estimate enemy armed forces in the following categories with the current strengths indicated:

1. Regular--118,000 (Composed of 53,000 VNA and 65,000 VC Main and Local).
2. Administrative Services--35,000-40,000.
3. Guerrillas--70,000-90,000.

Total: 223,000 to 248,000.

VIET CONG POLITICAL CADRES

Now let me turn to the Viet Cong political structure---through which the enemy forces are directed, controlled and supported. These are the political cadre. They were previously included in the total enemy strength figures. From now on we will carry an estimate of these cadres, but they will not be carried as part of the total military strength.

I should also repeat that our data in this category is not as good as in the case of the military. We have already undertaken additional studies of the political infrastructure to determine just who is important and who isn't. For example, a fifth columnist whom we have transferred from the guerrilla to the political infrastructure category should be further analyzed to determine his impact on the local populace. Obviously, some members of the infrastructure have more influence than others and are therefore more important pacification targets than others. In any case, we hope to have a better fix on this figure in the next few weeks or months.

The country team has developed the following definition for this Viet Cong infrastructure: "The political and administrative organization through which the Viet Cong control or seek to control the Vietnamese people. It embodies the party (People's Revolutionary Party) control structure, which includes a command and administrative apparatus (Central office for South Vietnam) at the national level, and the leadership and administration of a parallel front organization (National Front

for Liberation of South Vietnam), both of which extend from the national through the hamlet level. "

For a long time, we have carried a figure of 39,000-40,000 for this political infrastructure. I call your attention to the fact that the definition I just read includes the phrase "extend from the national through the hamlet level. " The old figure of an estimated 40,000 was based upon the GVN study from the early years of the war which went down only to the village level. Our increased intelligence now permits us to include cadres down to and including hamlet level. Our new estimate, which includes for the first time the infrastructure in the thousands of hamlets, is 75,000 to 85,000.

The function of the political cadre are not military and they do little if any fighting; therefore, as I said, we carry them separately from our order of battle of the VC/NVA armed forces. However, they represent a continuing potential for organizing and motivating the armed forces and they must not be overlooked as key elements who must be overcome along with the armed forces. We must consider them in enemy estimates, even though we have separated them out from the armed forces estimates.

RECAP

To sum up, our new, greatly broadened intelligence base has permitted a more realistic evaluation of enemy military and non-military strength.

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The total enemy order of battle is now between 223,000 and 248,000. We believe that this represents some decline in total enemy order of battle, although we do not yet have sufficiently good retroactive analysis to be precise in all categories. As I mentioned, VC/NVA organized unit strength probably peaked at 127,500 in September 1966 and has declined slightly.

Our estimate of the political cadre is 75,000 to 85,000.

In closing, I would like to restate two points once more:

First, the new study has not changed our estimate of the regular forces we face. Our primary intelligence efforts have been directed toward estimations of the regular forces and the number remains at about 118,000.

Secondly, in all other areas the new study has resulted in new figures. But these must not be considered increases or decreases from old figures. Since they are based on new data, they logically cannot be used in conjunction with old data for any firm comparisons of past and present enemy strengths.

OLD ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE AND POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
FIGURES

Enemy Order of Battle

Regular	119,000 (composed of 53,000 NVA and 66,000 VC Main and Local)
Administrative Services	25,000
Guerrillas/Irregulars	100,000 to 120,000
TOTAL	244,000 to 264,000

Political Infrastructure 39,000 to 40,000

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 3. [Methodology](#)
 4. [Results](#)
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DOI: 10.1002/for

Regular 119,000 (composed of 53,000 NVA and 66,000 VC Main and Local)

Administrative	
Services	25,000

Guerillas/Irregulars	100,000 to 120,000
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TOTAL	244,000 to 251,000
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Political Infrastructure 39,000 to 40,000

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DRAFT

12 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Philip Goulding
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Pentagon

SUBJECT : Proposed MACV Press Briefing on Enemy
Order of Battle

1. We have carefully reviewed the proposed MACV press briefing on enemy order of battle attached to Mr. Henkin's memo of 10 October 1967. We have serious substantive and procedural problems with the 10 October version of this proposed briefing and hence cannot support it or concur in its use.

2. With regard to the substantive issues, we offer the following comments:

a. We have no problems with the 112,000 figure used for the regular forces though we have not seen the evidence or methodology supporting the statement that "regular strength peaked at 127,500 in September 1966."

b. On administrative services, we believe the operative sentence should indicate that the US Government now estimates that there are at least 35,000 to 40,000 full-time personnel in this category. The draft briefing portrays the 35,000-40,000 figure as a minimum-maximum range. We regard it as a

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minimum threshold, believe the number of full-time personnel may well be higher, and are certain that additional large numbers of individuals perform administrative support tasks on a part-time but more than casual basis.

c. On the guerrillas, we cannot accept the statement that current guerrilla strength "is clearly down to between 70,000 and 90,000 with strong indications that the actual figure is closer to ^{11.}be lower than the higher limits of the estimate." The last clause of that sentence is particularly unacceptable. The understanding reached in Saigon during the recent CIA-DIA-INR-MACV order of battle discussions was that the guerrilla strength is now probably (not clearly) between 70,000 and 90,000.

d. We also cannot accept the way in which the rest of what used to be called "irregular" forces -- i.e., the self-defense, secret self-defense, assault youth and other casual elements -- are written off as fifth columnists and fellow travellers. This mis-states the facts. Although we agree that the self-defense, secret self-defense and assault youth should not be included in the military order of battle per se, we feel that in the aggregate these elements contribute a great deal to overall VC capabilities. Furthermore, evidence

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continues to come in showing that the VC make considerable use of these "irregulars" and not infrequently assign them actual combat tasks. We believe that any briefing given must be candid about these VC elements and should generally follow the narrative account of their strength and function agreed in Saigon -- the text of which is attached hereto.

e. On the political cadre, the number used (75,000-85,000) is that agreed upon in Saigon but the number was not developed in the manner outlined in your 10 October draft. This draft suggests that the new figure was developed by taking the old figure of 40,000 and adding political elements at hamlet level. This is simply not true. The 40,000 (actually 30,000) figure is an old GVN figure in circulation long before our current definitions of infrastructure were developed. It bears no historical or other relationship to the new figure.

3. Apart from these matters of substance there are elements of tone and procedure in your 10 October draft with which we have considerable difficulty.

a. It is true that our new order of battle figures derive from greatly improved though still imperfect intelligence and do not reflect any recent absolute increase in the size of

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Communist forces. This fact and the thought that these figures will be subjected to continuous review and frequent changes should be the basic theme of any press briefing. The 10 October draft, however, overstates our present degree of confidence in the administrative service, guerrilla and political cadre figures in a manner that will compound rather than improve our credibility problems.

b. The whole proposed treatment of the old irregular and new guerrilla figure will be torn apart by the Saigon press corps. It suggests that we have previously overestimated this category whereas exactly the reverse is true. As the press well knows, the old "irregular" figure of 100,000-120,000 was allegedly composed of one-third guerrillas and two-thirds self-defense/secret self-defense. Thus the press will believe, with justification, that our old "guerrilla" figure was on the order of 33,000-40,000. If we up the guerrilla estimate, as we should, to 70,000-90,000, this can hardly be called a downward adjustment.

c. Any attempt to ignore the other components that used to be carried in the "irregular" category or write them off as unimportant fifth columnists will be considered by the press (again with justification) as a rather clumsy and obvious attempt at a numbers shell game.

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d. On the political cadre, we would be much better advised not to lump our political cadre estimates with our military order of battle data nor to pretend that we now have a very firm handle on this component of the Communist organization. The 75,000-85,000 figure can be used, if necessary, but should be used as the number we get from applying our current definition of "infrastructure," with the added notation that this definition is in serious need of refinement and hence this number is perishable and not particularly meaningful. It should also be pointed out that we are now at work on refining our definition of the various components of the Communist political organization and hope to be able to assign meaningful numbers to these components as soon as this exercise is completed. When we do, this 75,000-80,000 figure will disappear.

4. We believe that the net effect of any briefing based on the 10 October draft would be to present a series of alleged intelligence judgments that could not be substantiated at this time and would almost certainly compound our credibility problems if they were presented in this form. Whether or not any briefing is given and the precise language to be used are, of course, matters outside our purview and ones that will require consideration at highest levels. We strongly recommend, however, that the briefing outlined in your 10 October draft not be given.

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 15 October 67
TO: <input type="text"/>		
ROOM	<input type="text"/>	
REMARKS:		
<p><input type="text"/> called regarding Carver's reply to Goulding. I said that this reply would be acceptable to you but suggested an addition. Last sentence should make it clear that if any part of the briefing is given, it should be made clear that it is a MACV briefing and does not reflect community position, certainly not CIA's.</p> <p><input type="text"/> Said he would make the point with Carver.</p>		
FROM: Act. Ch/D/T		
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VIETNAM AFFAIRS STAFF
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP78T02095R00020001-7

DATE: 12 October 1967

TO:

FROM: GACarver

SUBJECT: Attachment

REMARKS:

Attached is a draft reply to the 10 October memo on the proposed MACV briefing. I think it should probably be sent over the Director's signature, and, in any event, he will want to approve the text before it goes out.

Would you please let me have your comments and suggestions on this draft by noon, Friday, 13 October.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

Paul: *asked*
if this draft would look with you.

ACTION

SECRET

20 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Revised DOD Order of Battle Briefing

1. The attached documents were sent to me last night by the White House Situation Room. As you will note, they consist of a revised DOD draft for a MACV briefing on order of battle plus a transmittal memorandum.

2. Mr. McCafferty, who sent these over, called to say he understood that I had approved this revised briefing on behalf of CIA. I immediately contacted Mr. Rostow to set this straight and informed Mr. Rostow of the DCI's position: that the Agency neither concurred nor non-concurred in this briefing. Rostow said he understood perfectly and was personally against any OB briefing, but did want to discuss this new DOD draft at the Data Committee meeting on Monday, 22 October.

3. This draft is a distinct improvement over the DOD's first effort and reflects an attempt to meet many of our objections. I am asking Mr. Smith and my colleagues in ONE, OCI, CER and FE Division to let me have their comments on this new draft by noon on 23 October, so I can represent their views at the Data Committee meeting.

[Redacted Signature]

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

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O/DCI/SAVA:GACarver/mee

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Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000200190001-7



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Vietnam Affairs

19 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Moore
Executive Office of the White House

SUBJECT: MACV Press Briefing on Enemy Order of Battle

Reference our phone conversation this date.

Attached text of press briefing was worked out in coordination with MACV, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. It has been approved by Secretary McNamara.

Secretary McNamara and Director Helms believe the text should be approved by the White House.

Purpose of MACV giving a press briefing on the enemy order of battle is to get to the press enemy strength figures based on new estimates together with an explanation before these figures leak to the press without explanation.

The plan is for the press briefing to be given in Saigon as soon as practicable.

For your information the following are old figures that have been and are being given to the press, as compared to the new ones:

<u>Enemy Military Strength</u>	<u>OLD</u>	<u>NEW</u>
Regular	119,000	118,000
NVA	(53,000)	(53,000)
VC Main and Local	(66,000)	(65,000)
Administrative Services	25,000	35-40,000
Irregulars	100,000-120,000	-----
Guerrillas	---	70,000-90,000
Total	244-264,000	223,000-248,000
<u>Enemy Political Structure</u>	39-40,000	75-85,000

L. G. Hill
L. G. Hill
Colonel, USA
Special Assistant for SEA

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MACV BRIEFING ON ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

A new study of the size of the enemy military and political structure in South Vietnam has been concluded. The study has been conducted by this headquarters working with other segments of the intelligence community.

We have re-examined in depth over a period of several months not only the strength of the enemy's organized military units, but also his guerrillas, his administrative services personnel and the Viet Cong political organization.

Intelligence data for some of these categories is much more difficult to collect than is the case for others.

For some time now there has been relatively good intelligence available on the enemy's regular combat elements --- his "hard core" of NVA units and Viet Cong main and local force units. But solid information upon which to base strength estimates for the guerrillas and the administrative services has only become available in recent months and this has made our new study possible. Information on the Viet Cong political infrastructure is also improved, although still spotty.

In 1965-1966, we aimed our collection mostly against the primary threat---the enemy's hard core forces. We were forced to rely on broad estimates for other categories, knowing that these estimates were based on inconclusive data.

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The situation has now changed. Over the past eighteen months, we have improved the quality and the quantity of our intelligence collection programs for all categories. These improved programs, along with the documentation being ^{fully} uncovered by allied search and destroy operations ranging into areas of South Vietnam formerly considered as safe havens by the enemy, plus a marked improvement in quality and quantity of reports from the local populace, prisoners and increasing numbers of defectors, have enabled us to make a better estimate of the enemy's total military strength figures.

I want to emphasize that the new figures we are releasing today cannot and should not be compared with other than the hard core category of the figures we have been using. Although these older estimates were derived from the best information we had at that time, our new, expanded intelligence base has not only resulted in more accurate figures but has also shown us the areas of inaccuracy in our old estimates.

As a result, it is impossible to use the new figures to show that one category has risen or fallen in strength over the last six or twelve months. Except in the category of hard core forces, the old data was incorrect by virtue of being incomplete and founded on an inadequate base. What we have done is essentially to start over from a sound, broader intelligence base.

I would like to describe to you today two basic categories of enemy

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The category of armed forces includes several subdivisions--- regular forces (both North Vietnamese and Viet Cong), administrative services and guerrillas.

The political category includes only the political infrastructure.

Let me begin with the new order of battle for the enemy's armed forces, starting with his regular forces.

REGULAR FORCES

This category includes North Vietnamese Army units in South Vietnam and the Viet Cong main force and local force units.

The new estimates of the regular forces are essentially unchanged. We currently estimate 53,000 NVA forces and 65,000 VC main and local forces, for a total of 118,000 regular forces opposing us. As I said, our intelligence has been good on the enemy's regular elements and the new study confirms this. I might add that in retroactively adjusting our estimates of enemy regular strength as a result primarily of prisoner interrogation and captured documents, we now estimate that VC/NVA regular strength peaked at about 127,000 in September 1966, and has since declined slightly to the present figure.

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

The next category is administrative services, which comprises the personnel of military staffs from the national to the district level, as well as non-combat military support units directly subordinate to

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those staffs. As mentioned earlier, operations into former enemy safe havens and base areas have uncovered documentation of large numbers of these non-combat military people such as medical, personnel administrators, transportation and support elements.

Previously, we ^{had} ~~had~~ no record of many of these. The old data indicated an estimated 25,000 in this category; our new estimates show that there are least 35,000 to 40,000 full-time personnel. Let me re-emphasize that this does not mean an increase of 10,000 to 15,000 of the enemy in administrative services; it means simply that our intelligence data, while not firm today, is now better than it was in the past.

GUERRILLAS

The old intelligence data included an estimated 100,000 to 120,000 in a category of "Irregulars." It broke down these Irregulars into three subdivisions--guerrillas, self-defense forces and secret self-defense forces. The old data divided the 100,000 to 120,000 irregulars roughly, putting one-third of them into the guerrilla subdivision and the other two-thirds into self-defense and/or secret self-defense personnel.

As I said, those were acknowledged as rough estimates at best. The Viet Cong guerrilla alone is a full-time fighter who is usually organized into platoons and squads. He sometimes operates in his own village or hamlet and is usually assigned to protect specific villages and hamlets. He collects taxes and conducts terrorist and sabotage activities. He is a vital part of the military threat and often operates in concert with the

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members of VC/NVA regular units in his assigned area, but he has not been as identifiable.

Information from the documents captured this year strongly suggests that the guerrilla forces have been considerably larger than we had believed. Our recent studies put the probable guerrilla strength between 70,000 and 90,000. Again, it should be emphasized that these figures are not as firm as the figures for the regular forces.

Whereas the guerrillas are a definite "military threat," our newest intelligence indicates that the other subdivisions in the old "irregular" total---the self-defense and secret self-defense forces---should not be considered a "military threat" and part of the order of battle.

Self-defense elements, operating at all levels from village to region, are home guards, primarily for the control and light defense of VC-held areas. They are fixed; they perform most of their duties part time; they include personnel of all ages; and they have a high percentage of females. Some are lightly armed; many are not armed at all. While they are a large element obviously available as a base for recruitment as well as for political and logistical support work, they are not a fighting force comparable to the guerrillas.

Secret self-defense forces are essentially low-level fifth columnists, used for information collection. Both self-defense and secret self-defense personnel work for the enemy because the enemy now controls them. But our experience has shown that when government forces assume control

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these people usually cease their resistance and work for the government. Although they cause some casualties and some damage, they do not represent a continual or dependable force and do not form a valid part of the enemy's military force. We have, therefore, removed them from the order of battle.

The old system, then, broke down 100,000 to 120,000 irregulars into one-third guerrillas and two-thirds self-defense/secret self-defense. The new tabulation eliminates the broad irregular designation, changes the number of guerrillas to between 70,000 and 90,000 and removes from the order of battle the self-defense/secret self-defense estimate.

To sum up, we now estimate enemy armed forces in the following categories with the current strengths indicated:

1. Regular--118,000 (Composed of 53,000 NVA and 65,000 VC Main and Local).

2. Administrative Services--35,000-40,000

3. Guerrillas--70,000-90,000

Total: 223,000 to 248,000.

VIET CONG POLITICAL CADRES

Now let me turn to the Viet Cong political structure--through which the enemy forces are directed, controlled and supported. These are the political cadre. They were previously included in the total enemy strength figures. From now on we will carry an estimate of these cadres, but they will not be carried as part of the total military strength.

I should also repeat that our data in this category is not as good as in the case of the military. We have already undertaken additional studies

of the political infrastructure to give us a better understanding of how the political apparatus is organized, the relations of its component parts and their command relationships to each other. Obviously, some members of the infrastructure have more influence than others and are therefore more important pacification targets than others. In any case, we hope to have a better fix on the organization in the next few months. Once that is established, we will also have a better fix on its size.

The country team has developed the following working definition for this Viet Cong infrastructure: "The political and administrative organization through which the Viet Cong control or seek to control the Vietnamese people. It embodies the party (People's Revolutionary Party) control structure, which includes a command and administrative apparatus (Central office for South Vietnam) at the national level, and the leadership and administration of a parallel front organization (National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam), both of which extend from the national through the hamlet level."

For a long time, we have carried a figure of 39,000-40,000 for this political infrastructure. This figure was based upon the CVN study from the early years of the war which went down only to the village level. Our increased intelligence now permits us to focus on the infrastructure in much more detail and we have modified that CVN estimate to a figure of 75,000 to 85,000. But this figure, while improved, is not considered at all solid. Hopefully, our estimates will improve as our studies continue over the next few months.

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The function of the political cadre is not military. Therefore, we will no longer carry them in our military order of battle. However, the political organization, under orders from Hanoi, controls and directs all phases of the struggle, including the level of military operations. Therefore, they must not be overlooked as key elements who must be overcome along with the armed forces. We must consider them in enemy estimates, even though we have separated them out from the armed forces estimates.

RECAP

To sum up, our new, greatly broadened intelligence base has permitted a more realistic evaluation of enemy military and non-military strength. The total enemy order of battle is now between ²²³223,000 and 248,000. We believe that this represents some decline in total enemy order of battle, although we do not yet have sufficiently good retroactive analysis to be precise in all categories. As I mentioned, VC/NVA organized unit strength probably peaked at about 127,000 in September 1966 and has declined slightly.

Our estimate of the political cadre is 75,000 to 85,000

In closing, I would like to restate two points once more:

First, the new study has not changed our estimate of the regular forces we face. Our primary intelligence efforts have been directed toward estimations of the regular forces and the number remains at about 118,000.

Secondly, in all other areas the new study has resulted in new figures. But these must not be considered increases or decreases from

old figures. Since they are based on new data, they logically cannot be used in conjunction with old data for any firm comparisons of past and present enemy strengths.

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23 OCT 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. George Carver, SAVA

SUBJECT: Revised DOD Briefing on VC/NVA Order
of Battle

1. I have reviewed the revised DOD briefing and find it a distinct improvement over the first effort. Most of the CIA reactions to the first draft have been adequately met. There are, however, some respects in which the briefing could be further improved.

2. The tone of the briefing still implies a degree of confidence and certainty about OB numbers that is not justified. I believe the briefing, if it is given, should be more forthright in acknowledging that the numbers presented are highly perishable and that they will be subjected to continuous review and frequent changes.


3. The explanation of the derivation of the political cadres is still the same as that objected to in our consideration of the first draft.

4. The treatment of irregular forces is still unsatisfactory and we should encourage a return to the characterization of these forces as agreed at Saigon. This seems more important -- and judicious -- now that we have received some reports of the possible meshing of guerrilla and self-defense forces.

5. Finally, in view of the vulnerability of almost all of the OB figures, I would recommend that the Agency continue to dissociate itself from the briefing.


Chief, Trade and Services Division, OSR

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11 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. George Carver, SAVA

SUBJECT : MACV Press Briefing on Enemy Order of Battle

1. This memorandum is in response to your request for comments on the draft MACV press briefing on enemy order of battle.

2. I have reviewed the draft statement and, as seen from this Office, I must rank it as one of the greatest snow jobs since Potemkin constructed his village. I would, therefore, recommend most strongly that CIA not be associated either directly or indirectly with the briefing.

3. This briefing and similar fictions that MACV proposes to present in the near future present a series of vulnerable intelligence judgments that cannot be substantiated at this time and promise almost certainly to lead to even graver credibility problems than the current debate over orders of battle. I would make several specific comments about the subject briefing.

4. The tone of the briefing is unwarranted. It is at odds with the general tone of the current draft of NIE 14.3 and implies a coincidence of views between MACV and CIA that simply does not exist. The draft briefing also implies a certitude and precision about OB estimates that are completely unwarranted. The NIE is much more forthright about the many uncertainties associated with the OB estimates.

5. The draft NIE 14.3 states specifically that, with the exception of regular forces, we have underestimated the strength of enemy forces. The press briefing implies that we have over-estimated guerrilla forces.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6. The draft briefing fails to present the vital modifier of "at least" in setting administrative support forces at 35,000-40,000. NIE 14.3 not only says "at least 35,000-40,000" but acknowledges that they could be considerably higher.

7. The draft briefing states that previous estimates of guerrillas included too much when they settled on figures of 100,000-120,000. NIE 14.3 states, correctly, I believe, that we have previously underestimated these forces. The draft briefing then pours salt in the wounds by saying the number of guerrillas is 70,000-90,000 but closer to 70,000 than 90,000. This statement is nonsense and a blatant departure from the language agreed to by your team at Saigon.

8. The truly impossible aspect of the MACV briefing is its unbelievably cavalier and shocking consignment of the thousands of militia and self-defense forces into the realm of fellow-travelers or sympathizers. This is not a violation of the Saigon agreement, it is a complete and wanton scuttling of the whole exercise.

9. In view of the above, I repeat that the Agency should not become a partner in MACV's briefings. MACV's unilateral departures from the Saigon agreements give us all the justification we need to go straight again.

Acting Deputy Director
Economic Research

Distribution:

(S-2487)

Orig & 1 - SAVA (Mr. G. Carver)

1 - O/DD/I

1 - OCI (Mr. Lehman)

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1-ST/CS

OD/QER:

(11 Oct 67)

-2-

11 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. CCI/Indochina Division has been asked this morning to comment on the draft MACV press briefing concerning enemy Order of Battle.

2. We have only one major problem with this briefing and that is the omission of any significant discussion of the size, nature, and threat posed by the enemy's "self-defense militia." As the briefing now stands, it indicates, apparently, that the militia (the briefing uses the term irregulars) fall most properly in the "fifth column, fellow traveler or political infrastructure" category.

3. We think this is an entirely inadequate treatment of the militia. While it is true that the militia should probably not be considered an element of the enemy's "armed forces" in the briefing, we believe that the militia should be treated in a definite, separate category, at least along the lines of the paragraphs developed by the CIA-DIA-MACV conference on OB in Saigon and now reflected in the latest proposed draft NIE 14.3 in paragraphs 31, 32, and 33a (see attachment).

4. These paragraphs strongly imply that the militia is a significant element of the enemy's organization in South Vietnam, one that cannot be ignored or dismissed. Just since the Saigon OB conference, some five additional PW interrogations and enemy documents which testify to the military significance of the militia have come into the IC Division. Following are notes and quotations from some of this material:

--IR 1089-67

(Source was a main force officer from Vinh Long Province) Militia duty in his province consisted mainly of logistic support for other military forces. However, the militia were sometimes required to attack ARVN local force outposts to obtain weapons and arms. In Vinh Long, some of the militia were organized into regular fighting units.

- 2 -

- IR 1085-67 (Source was a local force soldier from Tay Ninh). He "believed the main function of the VC militia was to fight;" they sought to obtain military supplies from the EVNAF by overrunning small outposts.
- IR 1086-67 (Source was CO of a provincial VC battalion). Although the militia were not armed (many other sources say they have some arms), they did assist in the digging of tunnels, trenches, and in the carrying of supplies for the VC.
- IR 1087-67 (Source was a medical technician in MR 4) "The duty of the militia was to support guerrilla units and protect hamlets. The militia usually fought when supporting guerrilla units." Source felt that the militia groups were sometimes the best fighters among the irregular elements of the VC.
- Doc Log 08-1508-67 lists VC irregular strength in Long An Province at an undetermined date in 1967. It carefully includes 3,363 militia in addition to guerrillas among the VC irregular military forces.

5. Apart from the intelligence significance of the militia question, we believe the briefing will run into trouble as it now stands on this issue from a publicity standpoint. Our guess is that the press in Saigon is well aware of militia issue and will ask some embarrassing questions about the alleged "fellow traveler" role of the militia which will tend to substantiate their participation in military activity. Much better, we believe, to face this issue head-on with careful, precise as possible, definitions and orders of magnitude, rather than having possibly to reverse field again on the OB question at some later date.

Chief, Indochina Division
Office of Current Intelligence

Distribution:

- Orig. & 1 - George Carver (SAVA)
1 - [redacted] (O/ODI)
1 - Dick Lehman (DD/OCI)
1 - [redacted] (C/YEA)
1 - [redacted] (ONE)

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From Draft 14.3

31. The self-defense force is regularly reported and portrayed by the Communists as a military organization similar to village and hamlet guerrillas. It is clear, however, that their organization and mission differ. Self-defense forces include people of all ages and a substantial percentage of them are females. They are largely unarmed and only partially trained. The duties of self-defense units include the construction of bunkers and strong points, warning against the approach of allied forces, and the defense of villages and hamlets in VC-controlled territory. Their existence poses an impediment to allied sweeps and pacification. Self-defense forces do not leave their home areas, and members generally perform their duties part-time. In their defensive role, they inflict casualties on allied forces.

32. Secret self-defense forces are an additional element which operates in government-controlled and contested areas. They provide a residual Communist presence in such areas and support the Communist effort primarily by clandestine intelligence activities.

33a. Our current evidence does not enable us to estimate the present size of these groups (self-defense, secret self-defense, and other similar VC organizations) with any measure of confidence. Some documents suggest that in early 1966 the aggregate size of the self-defense force was on the order of

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150,000. This force and the other groups, however, have unquestionably suffered substantial attrition since that time, as well as appreciable decline in quality, because of losses, recruiting of some of their members into the guerrillas or other VC military components and, particularly, the shrinkage in VC control of populated areas. Though in aggregate numbers these groups are still large and constitute a part of the overall Communist effort, they are not offensive military forces. Hence, they are not included in the military order of battle total. Nevertheless, some of their members account for a part of the total Communist losses, either killed or permanently lost from wounds.

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BRIEFING ON "CROSSOVER"

1. In the vu-graphs, the erratic ups and downs of the monthly figures have been smoothed into secular trends by using quarterly averages of the monthly figures.


2. In vu-graph #1 the black line shows the trend by quarters of "firm" enemy losses, including KIA, died or disabled from wounds, captured, and defected. An estimate is made that other losses (from disease, accident, and desertion) have amounted to between 2000 and 5000 a month during 1967 (less, earlier). The more conservative estimate is used in calculating the crossover point. The 13,000 monthly firm loss plus the 2,000 estimated "others" gives 15,000 a month total.

3. Vu-graph #2 shows infiltration of NVA. The blue lines give secular trends: dotted line for "accepted" and solid line for "accepted" plus "possible." The solid line is used in calculating crossover because it is felt that this is, again, the conservative approach.

4. The graph shows a wide range of possibilities for recent months, on which figures are incomplete. The Colonel has used an assumption of 3500-4500 a month in calculating crossover, although he believes the actual figure is much lower.

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S E C R E T

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5. Vu-graph #3 shows estimated input from in-country recruitment. The new estimate for 1967, based on a study of documents and interrogations covering the first four months is 3500 a month, compared with the average of 7000 a month in 1966. The analysts believe it has declined further in recent months. In order to recognize that the rate did not abruptly drop by 50 percent at midnight 31 December, the drop is allocated over the last three months of 1966. The analysts believe that the drop actually began in the early summer.

6. Vu-graph #4 develops the crossover points by combining the loss and input graphs developed in the three previous vu-graphs. The crossover of the "best estimates" occurs in November 1966. The Colonel holds that in 1967 the enemy's net loss has probably run (conservatively) at 5000 a month, making a total net loss of 40,000 for the year through August and a projected 60,000 for the whole year.

7. The two most obvious weak spots in the study are problems of definition: net losses from what, and what constitutes "recruitment." The Colonel's initial response to having this pointed out was to suggest a cut-off at the bottom of the guerrilla ranks. That is, he suggests net losses be deducted from the combined main-force, local force, and guerrilla total, and that movement from other than these forces into these forces be considered "recruitment." This means that

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
going from self-defense or assault youths to guerrillas or directly to main forces is recruitment whereas movement from guerrillas to local or main forces or joining the self-defense forces is not.

8. This gives a relatively small and limited base from which to subtract the net losses. The 40,000 to date in 1967 (plus some from 1966), which the briefing says is a compounding of conservative estimates, would put quite a dent in the existing OB. The more radical range, which gives a net monthly loss of 14,000 (18,000 minus 4000) threatens to wipe out the entire enemy force by some date 1968.


9. Two possible solutions are to expand the base to include forces below the guerrillas or, alternatively, to reduce the loss figures substantially to account for the killed, Hoi Chanh, etc. who are not from the guerrillas or main and local forces.

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
ENEMY LOSSES VS. INPUT




ENEMY INFILTRATION JAN 66—MID 67



ENEMY RECRUITMENT 1JAN66-1APR67



ENEMY LOSSES JAN 66—JULY 67



— LOSSES BY MONTH
— AVERAGE MONTHLY RATE BY QUARTER
— EST NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES & SIMPLE DESERTION



Department of State

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ACTION SS 70

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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8327
INFO AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 197

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 SAIGON 7867

LIMDIS

DEPT PASS TO WHITE HOUSE FOR ROSTOW

KATHMANDU FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: MEASUREMENTS OF PROGRESS

REF: STATE 45007

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 7867 C O N F I D E N T I A L

1. WE PLAN THE FOLLOWING TO DEMONSTRATE TO PRESS AND PUBLIC
THAT WE ARE MAKING SOLID PROGRESS AND ARE NOT IN A STALEMATE:

A. PREPARATION FOR OUR OWN USE AND AS A BASIS FOR USE
WITH PRESS OF WRITTEN COMPARISON OUR SITUATION TODAY WITH
SITUATION VARIOUS OTHER TIMES BEGINNING IN EARLY 1965.

B. ADDITIONAL ON-THE-RECORD PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE
AMBASSADORS, GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND OTHER SENIOR OFFI-

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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CERS AS APPROPRIATE.

C. A REVIEW OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, P. O. W. AND HOI CHANH REPORTS SHOWING NVA AND VC ASSESSMENT TO THE END OF PROVING PROGRESS BY STATEMENTS MADE BY THE ENEMY HIMSELF. IN THIS CONNECTION, WHERE EXCERPTS USED FROM DOCUMENT, ENTIRE DOCUMENT WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO PRESS. ALL CAPTURED DOCUMENTS WILL BE DECLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SECURITY DEFINITELY REQUIRES CLASSIFICATION. OUR PRESENT THINKING IS THAT WE WILL HOLD ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFINGS WHENEVER SOME POINT CAN BE PROVED BY CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, WHICH COULD PER-

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 7867/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
HAPS RESULT IN WHITE PAPER PULLING ALL ELEMENTS TOGETHER TO PRESENT COMPLETE PICTURE. OF COURSE, ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENT-- WHICH MUST PRECEDE BRIEFINGS--WILL TAKE SOME TIME.)

D. A CONCERTED EFFORT TO SELECT FOR DETAILED BRIEFING OF THE PRESS CURRENT STORIES OF PROGRESS IN A PARTICULAR AREA OR VILLAGE--SIMILAR TO OUR CURRENT PROGRAM WITH RESPECT TO A PARTICULAR MILITARY ACTION. (IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN CREDIBILITY, OUTSTANDING FAILURES MUST ALSO BE BRIEFED IN THE SAME DETAILED FASHION.)

E. A SELECTION OF SUBJECT WHICH SHOW PROGRESS OF PARTICULAR UNITS OR OF PARTICULAR PACIFICATION PROGRAMS IN PARTICULAR AREAS AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF SELECTED PRESSMEN TO VISIT AREAS FOR STORIES IN DEPTH. (WE ARE MAKING A LIST.)

F. SIMILARLY, A SELECTION OF SUBJECTS ABOUT WHICH THE PRESS HAS DOUBTS, AND THE PRESENTATION OF CONCISE, HARD-HITTING BRIEFINGS DESIGNED TO ALLAY CREDIBILITY PROBLEMS. (THESE BRIEFINGS WILL COMPLEMENT AND SUPPLEMENT THOSE MENTIONED IN

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 7867/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
PARAGRAPH C ABOVE, BUT WILL NOT NECESSARILY DEPEND UPON INFORMATION AGENCE DATE.)

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G. MACV IS INSTITUTING THIS MONTH A MONTHLY J-2/J-3/COC SITUATION BRIEFING DESIGNED TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENTS ON PROGRESS AND TO PLACE CURRENT ACTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE. (THESE BRIEFINGS WILL BE EITHER ON-THE-RECORD OR BACKGROUND, DEPENDING ON RESULTS OF CURRENT STUDY TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN ON-THE-RECORD APPROACH WILL PERMIT MEANINGFUL BRIEFINGS.)

H. WE HAVE A NUMBER OF OTHER ACTIONS IN MIND WHICH ARE INCORPORATED IN A MISSION-APPROVED PRESS RELATION PLAN NOW ENROUTE TO THE DEPARTMENT.

2. IN ADDITION, WE ARE CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING TO THE SAME END:

A. HOW WE CAN BEST EXPOSE NEW GOVERNMENT AND ITS PLANS TO PRESS BY BACKGROUNDEERS--BY THIEU AND KY, FOR EXAMPLE, AS PLANS DEVELOP.

B. THE POSSIBILITY OF A REPORT TO THE NATION BRIEFING OF THE PRESS--PERHAPS IN JANUARY--OVER U. S. TELEVISION.

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3. THE ARGUMENTS GIVEN FOR STALEMATE AND OUR BASIC ANSWERS ARE:

A. THAT WE HAVE BEEN HERE FOR MANY YEARS AND HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO SHOW TERRITORIAL GAINS OR DEFINITE SIGNS OF WINNING. (ANSWER: THERE ARE DEFINITE SIGNS OF WINNING WHERE IT COUNTS, THAT IS, IN THE MINDS OF THE PEOPLE. WHILE WE CANNOT MEASURE THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE FOR OUR SIDE, WE SEE AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT THE ENEMY IS FAST LOSING CONTROL OF THE PEOPLE FOR HIS SIDE. HIS RECRUITMENT HAS DROPPED OFF SHARPLY, HE IS HAVING FOOD SHORTAGES, AND HE IS HAVING SERIOUS PROBLEMS COLLECTING VC TAXES. FURTHERMORE, HE ADMITS LOSING CONTROL OVER THE PEOPLE (SEE CAPTURED DOCUMENTS). THIS IS A MUCH MORE SIGNIFICANT MEASUREMENT OF WHO IS WINNING THAN TERRITORY GAINED. IN FACT, 40 PERCENT OF VIET-NAM IS UNINHABITED AND

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80 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE LIVE ON LESS THAN 40 PERCENT OF THE LAND.

IN ADDITION, WE MUST REMEMBER THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN HERE FOR YEARS. INDEED OUR FIRST COMBAT TROOPS ARRIVED ONLY A LITTLE OVER TWO YEARS AGO. OUR FIRST YEAR WAS SPENT PRIMARILY IN LOGISTICAL BUILD-UP, AND WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO

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EXERT THE FULL PRESSURE OF OUR FORCES ON THE ENEMY FOR ONLY A YEAR AND NO MORE. SIMILARLY, THE CURRENT PACIFICATION PROGRAM ONLY REALLY BEGAN WITH THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE, AND TOOK OVER A YEAR TO BUILD UP ANY MOMENTUM. ITS PROGRESS IS ALSO CRITICALLY DEPENDENT UPON ALLOCATION OF SUFFICIENT RVNAF SECURITY FORCES, WHICH WERE ONLY ALLOCATED IN 1967.

B. THAT THERE ARE AS MANY OF THE ENEMY IN SOUTH VIETNAM NOW AS THERE WERE ONE YEAR OR TWO YEARS AGO IN SPITE OF OUR FILL RATIOS. (ANSWER: WE BELIEVE THAT ENEMY STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM HAS DECLINED OVER THE PAST YEAR OR SO. FOR EXAMPLE, LARGELY FROM CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND P. O. 2.15, WE NOW ESTIMATE THAT VC/NVA ORGANIZED UNIT STRENGTH HAS DECLINED FROM A PEAK OF 126,000 IN AUGUST, 1966, TO ABOUT 118,000 NOW. IN OTHER CATEGORIES, SUCH AS GUERRILLAS, WE NOW BELIEVE THAT EARLIER ESTIMATES WERE TOO LOW BECAUSE OF INCOMPLETE INTELLIGENCE. BUT WE BELIEVE THAT VC GUERRILLA STRENGTH HAS DECLINED SIGNIFICANTLY. WE ESTIMATED THAT 7,000 VC A MONTH WERE BEING RECRUITED IN EARLY 1966, BUT THAT THIS HAS DECLINED TO 3-4000 NOW. THE NUMBER OF TROOPS INFILTRATED AND RECRUITED BY THE ENEMY OVER THE LAST SIX MONTHS HAS NOT BEEN AS GREAT AS HIS DEATHS, DESERTIONS, AND OTHER LOSSES.)

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CO. THAT THE ENEMY IS ABLE TO MATCH OUR ESCALATION OF THE WAR IN SPITE OF EVERYTHING WE DO AS EVIDENCE BY HIS RECENT DMZ SHELLINGS AND BY HIS ABILITY TO MOUNT ROCKET ATTACKS ON US BASES SUCH AS DA NANG. (ANSWER: THE ENEMY HAS BEEN BLOCKED IN HIS ATTEMPTS TO INFILTRATE BY SEA, HAS SUFFERED TREMENDOUS LOSSES IN HIS INFILTRATION VIA THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL, AND HAS PROBABLY BEEN FORCED TO CONCENTRATE ON THE DMZ AS THE ONLY COURSE LOGISTICALLY FEASIBLE IF HE WISHED TO MAKE ANOTHER MAJOR EFFORT. WHILE HE HAS GRIED TO ACHIEVE MAJOR VICTORIES BY CONCENTRATION OF FORCES IN THE DMZ, HE HAS BEEN

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FOILED IN EVERY ATTEMPT. HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR OUR BOMBING IN THE NORTH HE COULD PROBABLY HAVE CONCENTRATED MUCH MORE POWER IN THE DMZ AND IN THE SOUTH. OBVIOUSLY, THERE IS SOME LIMITATION ON HIS ABILITY TO FIGHT WHERE HIS LOSSES ARE SO GREAT AND HIS RECRUITMENT IN THE SOUTH IS PROBABLY CUT IN

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HALF. THIS IS BECOMING EVIDENT NOW IN ALL PARTS OF THE COUNTRY EXCEPT FOR I CORPS. BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THIS WAR HE CAN NOT BE PREVENTED FROM CONTINUING MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS ON US BASES, BUT THESE COSTLY INCIDENTS DO NOT HAVE MUCH SIGNIFICANT MILITARY IMPACT.

BASICALLY, THE ENEMY IS NOT ACCELERATING THE WAR. ON THE CONTRARY, HE IS CHANGING HIS TACTICS IN MOST AREAS. HE IS REPLACING GROUND ASSAULTS WITH ATTACKS BY FIRE TO CUT HIS PREVIOUSLY UNACCEPTABLE LOSSES. THESE SHELLINGS CAN HARASS AND INFLECT SOME CASUALTIES, BUT CANNOT RESULT IN VICTORY.)

D. THERE IS NO SHOWING OF ANY WEAKENING OF THE ENEMY'S WILLINGNESS AND CAPABILITY OF CONTINUING THE FIGHT, AND HIS MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS ARE ONE EVIDENCE OF THIS. ANSWER:

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THERE IS SOLID EVIDENCE OF THE WEAKENING, AT LEAST AT THE LOWER LEVEL, OF THE ENEMY'S WILL, ESPECIALLY THE SOUTHERN VC. HIS CAPABILITY IS OBVIOUSLY AFFECTED BY THE LOSSES HE IS TAKING OF MEN AND EQUIPMENT, THE LOSSES HE IS TAKING OF POPULATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM TO SUPPORT HIM, AND HIS DECLINING ABILITY TO RECRUIT IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THE ENEMY'S FAILURE TO MOUNT A MAJOR OFFENSIVE THIS YEAR, EXCEPT A ROCKET AND ARTILLERY OFFENSIVE IN THE DMZ AREA, IS EVIDENCE OF HIS LOSS OF CAPABILITY. THAT AN ENEMY CAN BE SUFFERING MORE THAN WE KNOW IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT WHEN THEN JAPANESE SURRENDERED IN WORLD WAR II, WE HAD NO IDEA THAT THEIR CAPABILITY HAD BECOME AS LOW AS IT HAD.)

E. THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO IMPROVEMENT IN THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT OR ARMED FORCES YET OUR OBJECTIVES HERE CAN BE OBTAINED ONLY BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE. ANSWER: DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS WE HAVE HAD A REASONABLY STABLE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, AND A POLITICAL EVOLUTION WHICH IS IMPRESSIVE IN A VERY YOUNG COUNTRY IN THE MIDST OF WAR. WE NOW HAVE A REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WHICH HAS BEEN WELL LED

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AND WHICH FOR ALL ITS IMPERFECTIONS IS BETTER THAN ANYTHING WE
HAVE HAD IN THE PAST. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE MANY IMPERFECTIONS
IN THE VIETNAMESE ARMY, IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT THIS
ARMY HAS BEEN INCREASED BY MORE THAN 50 PERCENT IN THE LAST
THREE YEARS, AND LEADERSHIP WAS NOT AUTOMATICALLY AVAILABLE
FOR THE EXPANDING FORCES. IT HAS BEEN ONLY DURING THE LAST YEAR
THAT THE MAIN FOCUS HAS BEEN ON QUALITATIVE AS OPPOSED TO
QUANTITATIVE IMPROVEMENT. DURING THIS PERIOD THE VIETNAMESE
ARMED FORCES HAVE IMPROVED. ALL THE USUAL INDICATORS OF
COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS-KIA, MIA, WEAPONS CAPTURED RATIOS,
DESERTION RATES, OPERATIONAL CONTACT RATES, SHOW A FAVORABLE
TREND. PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, THE RVNAF LEADER-
SHIP NOW DISPLAY INCREASING CONFIDENCE IN THEIR OWN UNITS,
CAPABILITY VERSUS THOSE OF THE VC/NVA.

4. OUR POLITICO-MILITARY OBJECTIVES HERE ARE BASICALLY TO
CONTAIN THE INVASION FROM THE NORTH WHILE INCREASING THE PER-
CENTAGE OF THE POPULATION IN THE SOUTH UNDER GVN CONTROL, AT
THE SAME TIME TRYING TO HELP ESTABLISH A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH
VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WITH THE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN THAT CON-

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TROL. VIEWED IN TERMS OF THESE OBJECTIVES WE HAVE MADE
STEADY PROGRESS ON ALL FRONTS SINCE OUR FIRST COMBAT TROOPS
ARRIVED HERE IN MARCH 1965.

5. EVIDENCE OF OUR PROGRESS WITH RESPECT TO THE ENEMY NET
MANPOWER LOSSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS EVIDENT FROM THE FOL-
LOWING ESTIMATES:

MONTHLY RATES

	RECRUITING	INFILTRATION (ALL CAUSES)	LOSSES	NET
1ST QTR 1966	7,000	12,000	8,300	P 10,700
2ND QTR	7,000	10,500	8,100	P 9,400

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3RD QTR	7,000	5,600	9,200	P 3,400
4TH QTR	5,500	3,300	9,900	- 1,100
1ST QTR 1967	3,500	5,100	14,900	- 6,300
2ND QTR	3,400	6,000	18,700	- 9,300
3RD QTR	3,100	6,000	12,000	- 2,900

P SHOULD READ PLUS SIGN

NOTES: IT SHOULD BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THESE FIGURES ARE ESTIMATES AND SUBJECT TO REFINEMENT.

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6. EVIDENCE OF NVA/VC LOSS OF MORALE IS AS FOLLOWS:

A: UNDER THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE OF RALLIERS FROM ABOUT 11,000 IN 1965, TO ABOUT 20,000 IN 1966, TO NEARLY 24,000 TO DATE IN 1967.

B: NUMEROUS CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, RALLIERS, AND PRISONERS OF WAR TESTIFY TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF VC ADMINISTRATORS MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH THEIR CADRE UNDER US MILITARY PRESSURE, THE DIFFICULTIES IN VC RECRUITMENT AND TAXATION, RESULTING IN FORCED CONSCRIPTION AND HIGHER VC TAXATION, THE GREATER DIFFICULTIES OF THE VC IN DEALING WITH THE POPULATION, THE DIFFICULTIES IN SOME AREAS OF OBTAINING FOOD AND MEDICINE, AND THE INCREASED FAILURE OF VC ADMINISTRATIVE CADRE IN MANY AREAS.

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

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C. NUMEROUS CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, RALLIERS, AND PRISONERS OF WAR TESTIFY TO NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY LOSSES OF 20-25 PERCENT AND MORE FROM BOMBING, SICKNESS, DISEASE AND DESERTION BEFORE REACHING THEIR DESTINATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND TO LACK OF FOOD AND MEDICINE AND POOR MORALE AMONG NVN TROOPS AFTER THEY ARRIVE. HOWEVER, ABOUT TEN PERCENT NVN RECOVER FROM THEIR SICKNESS AND EVENTUALLY COMPLETE THE TREK. HENCE THE OVERALL ATTRITION IS ABOUT 15 PERCENT.

7. EVIDENCE OF MILITARY PROGRESS IN THE SOUTH IS AS FOLLOWS:

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A. THE ENEMY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO MOUNT A MAJOR OFFEN-

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SIVE ALTHOUGH INTELLIGENCE INDICATED HE PLANNED TO DO SO LAST MAY AND JUNE.

B. THE ENEMY HAS GAINED NO MAJOR VICTORIES COMPARABLE TO HIS 1965 SUCCESSES IN AN ENGAGEMENT OF BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER IN OVER A YEAR.

C. A PROGRAM TO NEUTRALIZE 41 ENEMY BASE AREAS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM (THAT IS TO SAY TO DRIVE THE ENEMY THERE FROM AND DESTROY ENEMY INSTALLATIONS THEREIN) WAS INITIATED IN JUNE 1966. TO DATE, WE HAVE PENETRATED OR ATTACKED ALMOST ALL THESE BASES, AND, AS OF AUGUST 1967, HAD NEUTRALIZED 14 OF THEM.

D. FROM 1966 TO 1967 THUS FAR, ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION PER MONTH HAS INCREASED 63 PERCENT, ENEMY WEAPONS CAPTURED HAVE INCREASED 65 PERCENT (1,600 TO 2,600 PER MONTH), ENEMY MORTAR ROUNDS DESTROYED HAVE INCREASED 500 PERCENT (7,500 IN 1966, AND 19,000 IN SIX MONTHS OF 1967). SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION CAPTURED OR DESTROYED HAS INCREASED 125

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PERCENT (1.1 MILLION ROUNDS IN 1966, AND 1.5 MILLION IN SIX MONTHS OF 1967), AND ENEMY RICE CAPTURED OR DESTROYED HAS INCREASED NEARLY 50 PERCENT (13,000 TONS IN 1966, AND 10,000 IN SIX MONTHS OF 1967).

E. THE ENEMY TO FRIENDLY KILLED IN ACTION RATIO HAS INCREASES FROM 3.2 TO 1 IN 1966 TO 4.0 TO 1 DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1967, AND HAS CONTINUED TO INCREASE SINCE THEN. THE WEAPON GAINED TO LOST RATIO HAS INCREASED FROM 2.1 TO 1 IN 1966 TO 3.8 TO 1 IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1967, AND HAS CONTINUED TO INCREASE SINCE THEN.

8. EVIDENCE OF INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BOMBING IN THE NORTH IS:

A. THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED INCREASE IN THE TIME NECESSARY TO EFFECT REPAIRS OF BRIDGES, MARSHALLING YARDS, BY-

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PASSES, ETC., INDICATING LABOR AND MATERIAL PROBLEMS.

B. IN MAY 1967, OVER 150 THOUSAND SHORT TONS REQUIRED TRANSHIPMENT TO BYPASS EFFECTS OF INTERDICTION ON THE NE

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RAILROAD, AND IN AUGUST 1967, THE FIGURE HAD RISEN OVER 70 PERCENT TO 260 THOUSAND SHORT TONS, WITH TOTAL FROM MAY 1 TO SEPTEMBER 20, 1967 OF 932 THOUSANDS SHORT TONS.

C. THE PORT OF HAIPHONG HAS BECOME MORE AND MORE CONGESTED, WITH SHIPS WAITING TWO MONTHS TO UNLOAD.

D. FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT LOSS RATE HAS DECLINED FROM 18.1 AIRCRAFT PER 1,000 SORTIES IN 1966, TO LESS THAN TEN PER 1,000 SORTIES IN 1967.

9. EVIDENCE OF PACIFICATION PROGRESS AND INCREASED SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATION CONTROL OF THE POPULATION IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. FAR MORE RESOURCES ARE NOW BEING DEVOTED TO PACIFICATION. THE ADVENT OF MAJOR PW FORCES IS ALSO PERMITTING REDIRECTION OF A GROWING PROPORTION OF THE RVNAF TO PROVIDING THE INDISPENSABLE CLOSE-IN SECURITY FOR AREAS BEING PACIFIED. SOME 53 ARVN REGULAR BATTALIONS, 213 RF COMPANIES, AND 755 PF PLATOONS ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO DIRECT

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SECURITY SUPPORT OF THE 49 RD CAMPAIGN AREAS, THE NUMBER OF RD TEAMS (INCLUDING MONTAGNARD TEAMS) HAS RISEN FROM 453 AT END 1966 TO 611 ON AUG 31, 1967, AND SHOULD REACH 697 BY END 1967. THE RD MINISTRY BUDGET ROSE FROM 1.8 BILLION PIASTERS IN 1966 TO 2.5 BILLION PIASTERS IN 1967, MOSTLY FOR SELF-HELP AND OTHER PROJECTS TO HELP THE PEOPLE IN RD HAMLETS.

B. VARIOUS MEANS ARE BEING EXPLORED TO SUPPLEMENT RD

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TEAMS, THUS SPEEDING PACIFICATION, SUCH AS CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMS FOUND SUCCESSFUL IN BINH BINH, QUARTER ZONE APPROACH FOUND SUCCESSFUL IN BINH THUAN (SOME HAMLETS HISTORICALLY ARE DIVIDED INTO QUARTER ZONES WITH LEADERS, AND THESE LEADERS ARE NOW BEING PAID TO DEVELOP HAMLETS IN ACCORDANCE WITH RD CONCEPTS), ETC.

C. BASED ON GVN DATA FROM DECEMBER 31, 1965, TO DATE, A NET OF APPROXIMATELY 13 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION HAS BEEN ADDED TO GVN CONTROL DURING THIS PERIOD, BRINGING THE PRESENT TOTAL TO APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT, WITH VC CONTROL EXTENDING

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TO 14 PERCENT AND 16 PERCENT CONTESTED. OUR HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM, WHICH IS MORE CONSERVATIVE THAN GVN, LISTS 68 PERCENT UNDER GVN CONTROL COMPARED TO 64 PERCENT IN JANUARY 1967, 17 PERCENT UNDER VC CONTROL VERSUS 19 PERCENT IN JANUARY 1967, AND 15 PERCENT CONTESTED. OUR FIGURES INDICATE ONLY 2.8 MILLION PEOPLE LEFT UNDER VC CONTROL COMPARED TO 11.6 MILLION UNDER GVN CONTROL.

D. THE "CONTROL" FIGURES ARE VERIFIED BY THE ELECTIONS. THE RECENT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WERE HELD IN AREAS CONTAINING APPROXIMATELY 75 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE IN THE COUNTRY, INDICATING THAT AREAS SECURE ENOUGH TO HOLD ELECTIONS EXCEED THOSE LISTED UNDER GVN CONTROL EITHER BY THE GVN OR BY OUR HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM. THE INCREASE IN REGISTERED VOTERS BETWEEN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTION AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WAS BETWEEN 11 AND 12 PERCENT, MUCH OF WHICH WAS OCCASIONED BY THE INCREASE IN SECURE AREA, THUS CONFIRMING THE FIGURES OF INCREASED PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE SUBJECT TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

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THREAT TO THE ENEMY OF PACIFICATION IS EVIDENCED BY HIS CONCERTED EFFORT TO DESTROY RD TEAMS. HIS FAILURE TO DO SO IS INDICATED BY THE FACT THAT HE HAS FAILED TO DESTROY ANY TEAM. AND, ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF TEAMS HAS INCREASED, THE NUMBER OF INCIDENTS HAS REMAINED RELATIVELY CONSTANT. IMPROVEMENT OF THE TEAM FIGHTING ABILITY IS SHOWN BY A COMPARISON OF MARCH AND JULY OF THIS YEAR, BOTH OF WHICH MONTHS HAS 126 VC INCIDENTS AGAINST THE TEAMS, BUT WITH THE NUMBER KILLED IN JULY (32) ONLY ONE-THIRD OF THOSE KILLED IN MARCH (101).

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10. EVIDENCE OF IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS AND LOGISTICS, SO NECESSARY TO PACIFICATION, NATION BUILDING AND GENERAL ECONOMIC WELL-BEING, IS:

1. OF MILITARILY ESSENTIAL ROADS, THOSE OPEN DURING DAY-LIGHT HOURS INCREASED FROM 73 PERCENT IN FEBRUARY 1966 TO 85

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PERCENT IN AUGUST 1967. ESSENTIAL ROADS WHICH CAN BE TRAVERSED WITHOUT MILITARY ESCORT IN DAYTIME INCREASED FROM 29 PERCENT TO 50 PERCENT.

B. THE PORT OF SAIGON, CLOGGED WITH TRAFFIC A YEAR AGO, IS NOW ABLE TO HANDLE TRAFFIC EXPEDITIOUSLY. PORT CAPABILITY HAS INCREASED FROM SLIGHTLY OVER ONE MILLION SHORT TONS HANDLED IN THE LAST QUARTER OF 1965 TO ALMOST THREE AND A HALF MILLION TONS HANDLED IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1967.

II. EVIDENCE OF IMPROVEMENT OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES IS:

A. THE NUMBER OF DESERTIONS THIS YEAR IS LESS THAN HALF THE NUMBER FOR THE SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR AND THE NUMBER OF MISSION IN ACTION HAS DROPPED FROM 1,500 IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1966 TO 750 IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1967, AND TO 312 IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1967.

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B. THE TREND OF WEAPONS LOST HAS REVERSED. IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1966, RVNAF LOST 2,850 WEAPONS AND CAPTURED 1,400, OR AN UNFAVORABLE RATIO OF TWO TO ONE. IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1967, RVNAF LOST 2,050 WEAPONS AND CAPTURED 4,425, OR A FAVORABLE RATION TO TWO AND ONE-FOURTH TO ONE.

C. THE PERCENTAGE OF CONTACTS TO TOTAL OPERATIONS IS UP. IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1966, THERE WAS 360 CONTACTS IN 820 LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS, AND IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1967, THERE WERE 380 CONTACTS IN 760 OPERATIONS, OR AN INCREASE OF 15 PERCENT. IN SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS, THE RATE OF ENEMY CONTACTS HAS RISEN FROM 2.8 CONTACTS PER 1,000 IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1966 TO 3.7 CONTACTS PER 1,000 FOR THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1967 (A RISE OF 30 PERCENT) TO 4.3 CONTACTS PER 1,000 IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1967 (OR A RISE OF OVER 50 PERCENT). THE TOTAL NUMBER OF OPERATIONS IS DOWN BECAUSE OF THE PRESENT HEAVY COMMITMENT TO PACIFICATION.

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D. ARVN HAS TAKEN A NUMBER OF ACTIONS TO IMPROVE ITS
GENERAL EFFECTIVENESS. THIS INCLUDES (1) INCREASED FIGHTING
IN CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH AMERICAN UNITS AND THE CORRESPOND-
ING INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF U.S. ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT,
(2) NEW AND IMPROVED TRAINING COURSES, SUCH AS THE LONG
RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROL COURSE, GRADUATES OF WHICH
ARE INTEGRATED WITH U.S. LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS
AND THE RECYCLING OF MANEUVER BATTALIONS THROUGH A SIX-WEEK
NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER COURSE, AND (3) INCREASED PRO-
MOTIONS FROM THE RANKS DURING 1966, 500 DIRECT COMMISS-
SIONS, 20 BATTLEFIELD COMMISSIONS, AND 4,500 BATTLEFIELD PRO-
MOTIONS WERE AWARDED NCO'S. ALSO A SPECIAL OCS COURSE WAS
OFFERED, FROM WHICH 1,700 WERE GRADUATED.

E. PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED TO IMPROVE THE MORALE
OF ARVN, SUCH AS A PAY INCREASE IN JULY 1966, THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARVN COMMISSARY, AND A FREE ISSUE OF
AN OPERATIONS RATION IN THE FIELD BEGINNING JULY 1967, DE-
SIGNATED TO GIVE GREATER MOBILITY IN THE FIELD AND TO PREVENT
LIVING OFF THE PEOPLE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE.

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F. FAR FEWER REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCE POSITIONS HAVE
BEEN OVERRUN IN 1967 THAN IN THE CORRESPONDING PERIOD OF 1966.
A REVITALIZED TRAINING PROGRAM HAS BEEN INSTITUTED FOR
REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES, AND U.S. ADVISORS ARE WORKING
MORE EXTENSIVELY WITH REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES UNITS.

12. SOME RECENT EFFECTIVE ACTIONS BY THE VIETNAMESE ARMED
FORCES ARE:

A. IN MAY 1967, ON A COMBINED OPERATION WITH U.S.
MARINES IN QUANG TRI, AN AIRBORNE BATTLE GROUP STRUCK A
REGULAR NVA COMBAT BATTALION. RESULT: 250 NVA KIA; THE AIR-
BORNE LOST NINE KIA. THEIR USE OF SUPPORTING FIRES--AIR AND
ARTILLERY WAS SUPERB. IN A FIVE-WEEK PERIOD IN MAY AND JUNE,
TWO AIRBORNE GROUPS FOUGHT FOUR MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS IN 1 CTZ.

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RESULT: 833 NVA KIA; 63 ARVN KIA.

B. IN JUNE 1967, IN PHONG DINH PROVINCE IN THE DELTA, TWO RANGER BATTALIONS AND TWO RF BATTALIONS FINALLY RAN TO GROUND A VC MAIN FORCE BATTALION THAT HAD BEEN EVADING COMBAT FOR MONTHS. RESULT: 210 VC KIA; RVNAF, FIVE KIA.

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C. IN JULY-AUGUST 1967, THE 34TH AND 4TH VN MARINE BATTALIONS PARTICIPATED IN OPERATIONS CORONADO II. THE AGGRESSIVE AND GALLANT ACTIONS OF THESE UNITS ALL BUT DESTROYED THE 263RD VN MAIN FORCE BATTALION AND THE ELEMENTS OF THE 514 LOCAL FORCE BATTALION WERE BADLY MAULED. RESULT: 285 ENEMY KIA; 55 FRIENDLY KIA.

D. ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1967, IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE AT TAM KY, A COMPANY OF THE 3RD BATTALION, 5TH ARVN REGIMENT AND ELEMENTS OF THE 3RD TROOP, 4TH ARVN CAVALRY REGIMENT DEFEATED A GROUND ATTACK BY THE 70TH AND 72ND VC BATTALIONS. RESULT: 217 KIA; 21 ARVN KIA.

E. ON SEPTEMBER 8, IN BA XUYEN PROVINCE, IV CTZ, AN ENEMY COMPANY ATTACKED A REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AREA. AN RVNAF REACTION FORCE COUNTERATTACKED. RESULT: 54 ENEMY KIA, 20 SAMPANS DESTROYED; RVNAF, FOUR KIA.

F. DURING THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 8-15, THREE ARVN RANGER BATTALIONS ENGAGED ELEMENTS OF THE 2ND NVA DIVISION IN THE BORDER AREA BETWEEN QUANG NAM AND QUANG TIN PROVINCES. THE OPERATIONAL RESULTS WERE 212 ENEMY KILLED, COMPARED TO 32 ARVN KILLED.

13. EVIDENCE OF ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT WILL FOLLOW IN SEPARATE MESSAGE, AS WILL OUR SUGGESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO RETEL BRIEFING ON PROGRESS IN POPULATION CONTROL. ALSO, BACK-UP MATERIAL FOR SOME OF THE STATEMENTS HEREIN WILL FOLLOW BY POUCH. CHART REFERRED TO IN BRIEFING MESSAGE NOT YET RECEIVED.

LOCKE

CONFIDENTIAL

Statistics on Viet-Nam, by Month

SECRET

Table 2

1965

		CY 1965												Total 1965	
		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan - Dec	
Forces in South Viet-Nam															
End of Month															
RVN Infantry-Type Bns		127	127	128	128	128	128	128	132	132	132	132	133		
Total Strength (000) a/		248.7	248.6	249.1	256.3	261.0	265.7	275.5	283.1	291.6	298.0	298.5	302.6		
Regular b/		98.9	99.1	100.0	102.7	103.5	107.7	111.2	117.2	120.0	125.9	130.7	132.2		
Regional		19.7	19.2	19.1	21.0	20.4	21.7	23.1	23.1	24.4	26.6	26.6	28.1		
CIDG		367.3	367.9	368.2	380.0	386.9	395.1	409.8	423.7	436.0	450.5	453.8	463.2		
Sub-Total		165.1	165.6	166.6	172.5	174.9	180.0	184.6	191.1	197.8	202.5	207.4	212.5		
Popular		46.2	46.2	51.3	42.6	42.9	39.0	39.0	39.6	39.7	39.0	34.2	39.6		
Armed Combat Youth		578.5	573.7	575.1	580.4	583.1	583.1	593.4	604.4	612.5	625.0	626.4	632.3		
Sub-Total Mil/Par		34.0	33.6	34.7	37.8	38.8	42.7	43.8	47.2	48.5	49.3	51.6	52.3		
National Police		612.6	607.3	610.8	612.9	619.2	625.8	637.2	651.6	661.0	674.3	677.0	691.5		
GRAND TOTAL															
U. S. Infantry-Type Bns		81.8	81.8	81.8	81.8	81.8	81.8	81.8	81.8	81.8	81.8	81.8	81.8		
Total Strength (000) c/		101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5		
3rd Nation Infantry-Type Bns		69.5	69.5	69.5	69.5	69.5	69.5	69.5	69.5	69.5	69.5	69.5	69.5		
3rd Nation Strength (000) e/		71.5	71.5	71.5	71.5	71.5	71.5	71.5	71.5	71.5	71.5	71.5	71.5		
VC Strength (000) (Confirmed) f/		51.7	50.9	53.8	54.4	58.8	59.6	59.6	60.7	61.9	62.8	63.4	64.3		
Main/Local Forces		101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5	101.5		
Other Forces		178.2	171.4	194.4	194.9	199.4	205.5	209.7	224.4	226.0	246.2	246.2	246.2		
Total VC Confirmed		7	11	11	14	14	14	14	14	17	21	21	21		
NVA Infantry-Type Bns (Confirmed)		4.4	6.2	6.6	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.2	10.2	15.7	21.0	25.1	26.6		
NVA Strength (000) (Confirmed)															
Land Operations (On Size or Larger)															
AFVN		361	295	305	316	385	323	1,945	309	359	314	348	329	273	1,932
U. S.								28	14	22	18	36	43	43	3,877
3rd Nation															221
Combined								2	9	12	11	17	14	69	65
Air Operations (Attack Sorties) g/															
SVN: VNAF		1,629	1,331	1,309	1,485	1,322	1,435	8,511	1,790	2,265	2,478	2,947	2,509	2,961	14,626
U. S. R.		1,738	1,201	1,856	2,286	4,938	5,796	16,815	8,281	8,903	8,969	9,501	10,301	10,510	23,137
NVA: VNAF		1	60	119	97	96	96	466	52	34	19	8	10	36	73,340
U. S. R.		1	130	229	1,406	1,511	2,307	5,979	3,139	3,963	3,460	3,112	2,170	19,301	25,276
Laos: U. S. R.		16	136	303	834	785	311	2,589	1,005	784	1,041	966	1,475	3,047	8,258
Indicators															
Population Control: RVN		33	35	35	37	38	38	40	41	42	44	45	46		
% of Rural Pop h/ VC		23	24	24	24	23	23	28	28	27	27	26	26		
Hamlets Secured (cum-end of period)		3,011	3,029	3,133	3,067	3,228	3,186	3,345	3,462	3,602	3,703	3,828	3,903		
VC Incidents															
Attacks - On Size		1	3	3	4	11	6	28	6	5	5	10	7	45	73
Small Scale		62	79	83	39	47	63	373	42	47	25	42	50	239	612
Total Attacks		63	82	86	43	58	69	401	48	52	31	52	57	284	685
Other Incidents -															
Terrorism		1,469	1,411	1,476	1,407	1,555	1,764	9,122	1,706	1,597	1,530	1,969	2,234	11,608	20,730
Sabotage		272	267	240	149	365	469	1,752	400	349	278	142	186	2,370	4,132
Propaganda		170	91	90	96	115	103	665	154	200	185	255	317	1,309	1,974
AA Fire		2,206	1,962	2,056	1,860	2,263	2,597	12,564	2,520	2,495	2,473	3,330	3,638	18,563	4,008
Total Incidents		24	29	36	22	17	15	13	10	12	10	10	6	66	209
Officials killed		87	51	29	18	24	41	280	7	6	6	8	6	41	323
Other civilians killed		130	79	92	24	115	186	946	144	86	110	125	130	745	1,691
kidnapped		430	315	635	849	596	1,591	4,416	1,101	376	464	691	494	450	3,576
Combat Deaths															
U. S.		12	44	15	40	32	71	214	76	88	97	169	469	252	1,251
Viet-Nam		12	45	13	41	32	71	216	76	88	97	169	469	254	1,253
Laos															
Total															
SVN															
Regular Forces		360	388	271	274	419	553	2,205	642	341	274	430	451	661	2,799
Other Forces		544	552	480	317	630	658	3,181	518	467	381	531	776	3,056	6,239
Total		904	940	751	591	1,049	1,211	5,386	1,160	808	655	961	1,227	2,857	11,243
Weekly Average		204	220	170	138	237	283	262	182	182	153	243	280	223	216
3rd Nation															
Total Free World															
VC/RVA		2,203	1,564	2,022	1,909	1,975	2,208	11,881	2,960	3,624	3,485	3,874	5,516	4,076	23,555
Weekly Average		497	351	457	445	446	515	2,675	675	818	813	875	1,252	920	534
VC/RVA Captured*		572	302	394	516	549	2,570	447	508	608	634	660	592	516	3,657
Deaths Lost															
Friendly - Crew Served		22	148	60	28	139	236	633	67	40	41	15	21	17	210
Individual		1,678	2,306	1,382	729	1,562	2,131	9,806	1,308	696	737	747	1,109	1,711	6,254
Total		1,700	2,454	1,442	757	1,701	2,367	10,441	1,375	705	778	762	1,126	1,728	6,464
Weekly Average		394	614	326	177	384	557	404	310	159	182	172	263	390	246
Enemy - Crew Served		13	8	18	39	14	25	117	15	17	19	32	181	50	317
Individual		698	612	680	934	817	768	4,509	807	1,057	819	978	1,983	1,106	6,732
Total		711	620	698	973	831	793	4,626	822	1,074	838	1,013	2,164	1,138	7,049
Weekly Average		161	155	158	227	185	185	179	186	243	196	229	505	261	269
RVN Desertions f/															
RVAF		6,903	7,238	11,165	10,267	9,596	10,333	55,502	9,933	10,639	8,689	10,287	8,937	9,177	57,662
CIDG															
Total		6,903	7,238	11,165	10,267	9,596	10,333	55,502	9,933	10,639	8,689	10,287	8,937	9,177	57,662
VC Defections - Military															
Other		231	295	343	422	703	719	2,713	562	1,278	793	725	1,129	735	5,223
Total		162	148	161	189	346	265	1,241	264	199	368	340	406	371	1,947
Regular, Regional and Popular Forces		393	443	504	581	1,049	984	3,954	1,477	1,477	1,161	1,066	1,534	1,106	7,270

a/ Includes Coastal Forces. b/ Excludes 1 BLT aircraft off Qui Nhon. c/ All B/L's now counted in-country. d/ Prior to 11 March 1967, includes RVN all services and excludes Army personnel assigned but not joined. Subsequent data include RVN all services and Army medical patients and exclude Army transient personnel in and out. e/ Exclusive of French. f/ Includes Political and Administrative Services Personnel. Detail may not add to total due to rounding. g/ Includes strikes, ARVN and police, flank suppression, interdiction and direct air support sorties. h/ Excludes the 6 autonomous cities under RVN control. i/ Includes RVNAF desertions from Regular, Regional and Popular Forces through June 1965. From then on includes also desertions from CID

Statistics on Viet-Nam, by Month

SECRET

Table 3

1966

	CY 1966													Total 1966
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jul - Dec	
Forces in South Viet-Nam End of Month														
RVN Infantry-Type Bns	133	139	141	141	141	152	157	157	157	157	157	158		
Total Strength (000)	307.9	308.6	314.3	314.4	310.4	313.6	317.4	319.9	322.1	319.6	321.3	322.9		
Regular a/	133.9	136.9	136.8	136.6	137.9	141.4	141.3	143.5	145.5	148.9	149.2	149.9		
Regional	28.4	27.7	28.9	28.9	28.9	30.4	31.2	32.2	32.2	33.5	35.5	34.7		
CIDG	470.2	472.2	480.0	478.9	477.0	485.4	489.9	495.6	499.8	502.0	506.0	507.5		
Sub-Total	135.6	136.0	135.3	136.9	137.2	137.7	138.7	139.7	140.6	145.2	149.2	150.1		
Popular	32.3	31.2	31.8	27.8	25.4	22.8	21.9	19.9	20.8	21.1	21.2	20.0		
Armed Combat Youth	638.1	642.4	647.1	643.6	639.6	645.9	650.5	655.2	661.2	668.3	676.4	677.6		
Sub-Total M1/Par	34.1	34.3	34.3	34.0	33.8	34.6	35.8	36.3	36.6	37.2	37.8	38.1		
National Police	650.8	659.7	660.8	657.6	653.4	650.9	653.9	659.5	665.8	672.8	678.2	679.9		
GRAND TOTAL														
U. S. Infantry-Type Bns b/	41	42	43	47	48	49	50	57	60	66	66	75		
Total Strength (000) c/	106.4	108.0	108.2	121.2	124.3	125.2	127.0	132.8	133.1	142.4	142.4	145.3		
3rd Nation Infantry-Type Bns	10	10	10	13	14	14	17	17	17	23	23	23		
3rd Nation Strength (000) d/	22.4	23.0	22.6	27.5	28.0	29.9	30.6	34.7	34.9	51.7	51.9	52.6		
VC Infantry-Type Bns (Confirmed)	91	91	91	89	87	86	86	86	87	83	83	83		
VC Strength (000) (Confirmed) e/	66.9	67.1	67.3	68.5	67.8	67.0	69.4	69.4	70.4	68.4	67.6	68.0		
Other Forces	104.2	104.2	104.2	104.4	173.5	173.9	172.0	172.5	170.1	176.2	176.2	176.3		
Total VC Confirmed	231.1	231.3	231.5	232.8	241.3	241.6	244.4	244.9	246.5	244.6	243.8	244.3		
NVA Infantry-Type Bns (Confirmed)	35	45	48	51	50	52	55	64	67	66	66	63		
VC Strength (000) (Confirmed)	88.9	35.1	37.5	39.3	40.1	51.1	51.8	52.6	54.1	50.4	46.8	46.1		
Land Operations (By Size or Larger)														
ARVN	286	304	376	337	354	304	1,961	328	338	345	297	328	1,961	3,942
U. S.	40	57	57	59	64	61	335	70	76	77	71	76	471	806
3rd Nation	1	1	7	8	11	8	24	24	22	21	16	11	112	150
Combined	21	3	11	19	17	27	96	20	18	23	32	33	146	244
Air Operations (Attack Sorties) f/														
SVN: VNAF	2,473	2,801	2,867	2,400	2,464	2,712	15,717	2,886	2,963	2,593	2,776	2,610	2,657	15,915
U. S.	9,673	10,506	12,690	9,218	9,515	10,342	61,952	12,529	11,626	10,667	9,871	11,046	11,359	67,098
VNAF	232	2,809	4,408	5,306	4,362	7,522	24,615	9,555	11,790	12,326	8,697	7,253	6,709	56,740
U. S.	8,105	5,584	6,459	6,338	4,523	3,628	39,411	2,229	659	1,309	2,375	3,094	4,883	18,705
Laos: U. S.														
Incidents														
Population Control: SVN	46	48	46	46	48	49	48	49	49	51	51	52		
(% of Rural Pop.) VC	26	26	25	25	25	24	22	22	22	21	20	20		
Manets Secured (cum-end of period)	3,928	3,958	3,949	3,856	4,012	4,094	4,088	4,155	4,190	4,346	4,318	4,401		154,800
VC Infiltration (Accepted-Conf-Prob)														
VC Incidents														
Attacks - By Size	5	6	10	4	4	6	35	5	5	8	8	9		44
Small Scale	65	61	42	73	49	62	354	91	59	86	119	84	101	540
Total Attacks	70	69	52	77	53	68	389	91	64	86	121	86	101	599
Other Incidents - Harassment														
Terrorism	2,490	1,829	2,332	2,283	2,552	2,382	13,868	1,952	1,693	1,335	1,608	1,566	1,634	10,288
Subotage	312	201	212	252	259	211	1,483	200	113	90	125	98	729	2,212
Propaganda	299	172	154	110	106	110	551	86	87	115	81	72	112	553
AA Fire	743	809	920	813	560	598	4,153	561	385	621	869	794	765	3,975
Total Incidents	3,914	3,100	3,670	3,235	3,566	3,359	20,844	3,008	2,401	2,864	2,923	2,778	2,817	16,831
Officials Killed	10	13	8	13	18	7	69	7	22	12	27	14	17	99
Kidnaped	9	12	16	9	28	2	76	1	20	9	26	23	100	176
Other civilians killed	153	85	145	168	192	127	870	73	100	123	162	109	127	694
Kidnaped	240	507	406	171	159	332	1,815	41	283	210	468	477	340	1,819
Combat Deaths														
U. S.														
Viet-Nam	282	433	506	311	462	503	2,497	435	395	419	338	473	432	2,492
Laos	1	2	1	5	2	4	14	1	1	2	2	5	19	5
Total	282	435	507	316	464	507	2,511	435	396	419	340	475	432	2,497
SVN														
Regular Forces	216	464	426	185	270	431	1,992	346	255	272	325	327	1,847	3,339
Other Forces	531	252	512	389	391	429	2,804	514	467	294	581	482	488	2,826
Total	747	716	938	574	661	860	4,796	860	722	566	906	809	815	6,165
Weekly Average	747	716	938	574	661	860	4,796	860	722	566	906	809	815	6,165
3rd Nation	74	56	59	30	19	41	281	32	44	132	205	168	178	182
Total Free World	1,103	1,509	1,504	980	1,144	1,408	7,508	1,327	1,161	1,015	1,310	1,366	1,276	7,455
VC/NVA														
Weekly Average	2,648	4,727	5,685	2,818	4,232	4,835	24,932	5,297	5,860	4,450	5,665	5,447	3,964	30,592
VC/NVA Captured	598	1,282	1,284	628	957	1,123	564	1,156	1,323	1,040	1,271	873	1,164	1,265
Weapons Lost														
Friendly - Crew Served	14	19	35	11	18	20	117	12	17	11	8	13	19	197
Individual	921	1,056	1,356	584	475	715	5,109	732	637	415	641	811	4,075	9,184
Total	935	1,075	1,391	595	493	735	5,226	744	654	426	649	830	4,155	9,381
Weekly Average	211	259	323	139	111	171	804	168	148	99	192	187	158	180
Enemy - Crew Served	25	82	104	22	35	344	612	159	125	120	172	141	79	796
Individual	534	1,137	1,203	807	1,052	3,417	8,870	1,455	1,217	1,310	1,805	1,282	1,259	8,368
Total	559	1,219	1,307	829	1,087	3,761	9,482	1,614	1,342	1,430	1,977	1,423	1,338	9,164
Weekly Average	221	305	363	193	245	678	367	364	303	334	446	302	347	357
RVN Dispositions f/														
RVN f/	9,251	14,110	13,276	12,901	12,698	10,742	72,968	9,221	8,280	6,091	5,968	6,976	6,948	43,438
CIDG	179	774	496	1,031	1,122	907	4,509	552	500	500	500	337	772	3,191
Total	9,430	14,884	13,772	13,932	13,810	11,649	77,477	9,773	8,780	6,591	6,468	7,313	7,720	46,629
VC Defections - Military														
Other	886	1,547	1,345	1,133	846	585	6,644	894	751	685	1,089	1,497	1,396	6,253
Total	367	667	637	491	494	494	5,150	413	382	349	740	1,120	4,199	7,345
	1,253	8,214	1,982	1,624	1,342	1,379	9,794	1,307	1,173	975	1,829	2,645	2,516	10,448

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Statistics on Viet-Nam, by Month
1967

Table 2

	CY 1967												Total 1967
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	
Forces in South Viet-Nam End of Month													
RVN Infantry-Type Bns	158	154	154	154	154	154	154						
Total Strength (000)	320.5	318.6	319.7	321.9	324.0	326.7	327.8						
Regular A/	145.9	143.7	141.8	142.0	141.9	141.3	142.0						
Regional	32.3	32.3	33.6	31.5	31.5	31.5	31.5						
OIDG	408.7	404.6	409.1	409.4	407.1	407.5	409.9						
Sub-Total	147.4	146.0	143.6	142.5	141.3	141.3	140.9						
Armed Debt Youth	20.0	19.6	19.6	19.9	19.3	18.9	17.8						
Sub-Total NLI/Par	666.1	660.2	658.3	657.8	657.7	657.7	666.7						
National Police	60.2	60.1	62.1	63.5	63.7	64.5	64.5						
GRAND TOTAL	726.3	720.3	720.4	721.3	731.4	732.2	733.2						
U. S. Infantry-Type Bns	98 B	98 B	98 B	98 B	98 B	98 B	98 B						
U. S. Strength (000) A/	403.4	413.5	419.8	434.3	440.7	447.5	457.2						
3rd Nation Infantry-Type Bns	23	23	23	23	23	23	23						
3rd Nation Strength (000) A/	23.1	23.0	23.3	23.5	23.6	23.2	23.7						
VC Infantry-Type Bns (Confirmed)	83	83	83	83	83	83	83						
VC Strength (000) (Confirmed) A/	83.6	83.6	83.6	83.6	83.6	83.6	83.6						
Main/Local Forces	67.6	66.5	65.6	64.9	65.1	64.6	65.2						
Other Forces	176.2	176.2	176.2	176.2	176.2	176.2	176.2						
Total VC Confirmed	243.8	243.3	241.8	241.1	241.3	240.8	241.4						
NVA Infantry-Type Bns (Confirmed)	64	64	67	70	70	70	69						
NVA Strength (000) (Confirmed)	47.3	47.2	50.0	52.1	51.2	50.7	50.1						
Land Operations (In Size or Larger)													
ARMY	368	281	340	289	274	286	1898	304	392				
U. S.	87	91	93	101	106	110	500	105	112				
3rd Nation	22	20	16	19	16	11	104	15	13				
Combined	17	18	9	11	12	8	75	14	8				
Air Operations (Attack Sorties) A/													
BVN: VNAF	2719	2125	2788	2737	2718	2639	15725	2709	2671				
U. S.	12598	12272	14872	14092	16912	15106	85895	16597	18021				
VNAF	6578	5488	6422	6563	11305	11457	22717	11285	11846				
U. S.	5598	6759	5320	5186	2653	1602	27118	1495	1379				
Indicators													
Population Control: RVN	53	52	53	53	57	57	57						
(% of Rural Pop) A/ VC	18	18	18	18	18	18	18						
Hamlets Secured (cum-end of period)			4602	4591	4704	4723							
VC Infiltration (Accepted-Conf-Prob)								19900					
VC Incidents													
Attacks - In size	1	2	7	7	4	8	21	7	1				
Other	141	115	212	155	189	166	978	190	203				
Total Attacks	142	117	219	162	193	166	1001	197	204				
Other Incidents - Harassment	1638	1376	1733	1792	1781	1399	9721	1558	1434				
Terrorism	134	123	111	200	202	528	181	181	210				
Subotage	70	39	50	67	74	72	372	141	145				
Propaganda	128	76	49	109	59	44	461	61	96				
AA Fire	1287	1452	1221	1164	1260	1036	7406	940	1173				
Total Incidents	3369	3183	3379	3404	3571	2993	18899	3078	3271				
Officials Killed	21	18	22	25	24	25	135	378	371				
Kidnapped	25	11	9	11	23	9	89	5	5				
Other civilians killed	107	123	199	201	239	414	1273	208	227				
Kidnapped	300	323	201	207	321	420	1778						
Combat Deaths													
U. S.	512	658	943	710	1232	828	4883	781	535				
Viet-Nam	8	4	1	-	-	2	16	-	-				
LAOS	520	662	944	710	1233	830	4899	781	535				
BVN													
Regular Forces	339	342	477	576	530	270	2534	339	382				
Other Forces	548	429	641	359	496	501	2974	327	470				
Total	887	771	1118	935	1026	771	5508	666	852				
Weekly Average	200	193	259	238	232	180	213	150	192				
3rd Nation	77	95	54	56	112	74	468	102	89				
Total Free World	1404	1508	2116	1701	2371	1675	10875	1540	1858				
VC/NVA	6064	7341	9351	6227	9608	7324	46142	7521	5810				
Weekly Average	1369	1653	2112	1403	2125	1716	1785	1789	1312				
VC/NVA Captured/Retained	1017	722	3832	3351	4991	6123	20066	8362	7231				
Prisoners of War (cum)													
Weapons Lost													
Friendly - Crew Served	6	12	26	18	15	8	89	15	48				
Individual	732	520	958	707	631	528	4076	245	473				
Total	738	532	984	725	646	536	4161	260	521				
Weekly Average	167	133	222	169	146	125	161	126	118				
Enemy - Crew Served	94	188	236	143	254	189	1100	325	159				
Individual	2256	2207	3990	1975	2527	1794	14359	1163	1909				
Total	2350	2395	3826	2118	2781	1979	15459	3508	2068				
Weekly Average	533	599	863	494	688	462	598	792	467				
NVA Desertions A/													
BVN/AF	5900	5860	6486	4542	5062	5508	33358	4946	5100				
OIDG	204	232	462	1032	1194	1000	4124	1187	1100				
Total	6104	6092	6948	5574	6256	6508	37482	6133	6200				
VC Defections - Military													
Other	1497	2105	3155	1873	1466	1412	11508	1936	1298				
Total	1024	1064	1758	1145	884	693	6568	508	674				
2521	3169	4913	3018	2350	2105	18076	2044	1978					

P - Preliminary

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Sources: MACV
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